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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
L. DIANE TURNER, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
CRAIG H. MCQUEEN, M.D., and ' 
UTAH ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES & ] 
SPORTS MEDICINE CLINIC, ] 
Defendants. ] 
| Case No. 930187-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon The Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2-2 (3)(j) 
(1992). 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue for review is whether or not the trial court judge 
abused her discretion in ruling that Dr. Robert Home, M.D. had 
never agreed to act as Plaintiff's expert, and since Dr. Home, 
M.D., for the first time on September 11, 1992 indicated to 
Plaintiff that he would not act as such expert, the trial court 
1 
judge abused her discretion in not granting Plaintiff's motion 
for a continuance of her trial, and an extension of time in 
which to designate a replacement expert. The standard of review 
is whether or not the court's decision was clearly erroneous. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
No determinative law has been found as the facts of this 
case are not on point with cases that have been discovered. The 
Case, under the facts herein, is one of first impression. 
Instructive cases are cited. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The surprise event of Dr. Home, M.D., Plaintiff's 
treating physician/surgeon, claiming he would not testify, and 
doing so for the first time after the designation of expert 
cutoff date had passed, was an event beyond Plaintiff's control, 
and Plaintiff should have been allowed to continue the trial and 
replace such designated expert. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ABUSED 
HER DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL 
AND DESIGNATE A NEW EXPERT TO 
REPLACE THE DESIGNATED EXPERT 
WHO, AT THE LAST INSTANCE, 
DECIDED NOT TO TESTIFY. 
The trial Court has substantial discretion in deciding 
whether to grant continuances. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, at 1377 (Utah 1988). In the case before the bar, it is 
clear that Plaintiff properly and timely designated her expert 
witness on July 31, 1992 pursuant to Court order. It is also 
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clear that Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel learned for the 
first time, after designation of expert and discovery cutoff 
dates had passed, that Plaintiff's designated expert, Dr. Robert 
Home, M.D., was going to refuse to testify for Plaintiff. Such 
refusal of Plaintiff's designated expert to testify was learned 
on September 11, 1992, nearly six weeks after the expert 
designation of experts deadline had passed. Further, it is clear 
that Defendant, or Defendant's counsel, contacted Plaintiff's 
designated expert without Plaintiff's or Plaintiff's counsel 
knowledge or consent and obtained an affidavit from Plaintiff's 
designated expert stating that he would not testify for 
Plaintiff. (See Affidavit of Dr. Robert Home, M.D., as attached 
to Defendant's Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgement; and see also Affidavit of L. Diane 
Turner, as attached to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Motion 
for Summary Judgment)• 
Plaintiff's only alternative as a result of this surprise 
event was to move for a continuance of the scheduled trial date, 
and to move for an extension of time in which to designate an 
expert to replace Dr. Home. Plaintiff requested that she be 
allowed ninety (90) days in which to designate a replacement 
expert. The trial was scheduled for November 30, 1992. The 
continuance should have been for a reasonable period of time 
(Plaintiff suggested 90 days) to allow for the designation of 
Plaintiff's expert, and thereafter for the deposing of the 
designated expert by Defendant. 
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Further, the trial court presumably based her decision on 
the deposition testimony of Plaintiff that Defendants asserted 
was testimony showing Plaintiff's designated expert never 
intended to testify in her behalf. Plaintiff's deposition was 
taken by Defendants on January 23, 1992. Defendants took two (2) 
lines from Plaintiff's testimony, (Plaintiff's Deposition, page 
81, lines 9 and 10), and propose from that testimony Dr. Home, 
M.D. never, ever, criticized Dr. McQueen. All one need do is 
look at the full context of the preceding series of questions in 
Plaintiff's deposition to see that such a proposition was not 
accurate. The two (2) lines of testimony relied upon by 
Defendants were taken out of context, the full context of the 
testimony being found on page 76, line 9, through page 81, line 
14. These pages are Plaintiff's testimony concerning when she 
fired Dr. McQueen and hired Dr* Home, and an explanation of how 
Dr. Home immediately put her in the hospital and operated on her 
knee. Her testimony was that Dr. Home, at the time of that first 
visit with Dr. Home, never criticized Dr. McQueen, (See, 
Plaintiff's Deposition, page 76, lines 9-25, through page 81, 
lines 1-14). 
Defendants also took three (3) other deposition 
testimony lines, i.e., page 96, lines 23-25, for the proposition 
that no medical experts have been critical of Dr. McQueen. 
Plaintiff's testimony, by deposition, was taken on January 23, 
1992, experts were not designated until July 31, 1992. At the 
time of Plaintiff's deposition Plaintiff did not consider Dr. 
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Home to be anything other than her treating physician. 
Additionally, Plaintiff, personally, had not talked to any other 
medical experts specifically on the issue of whether or not Dr. 
McQueen had committed malpractice as of January 23, 1992. 
On several occasions during Dr. Home's care of Plaintiff he 
made comments to her, and there are comments in some of his 
reports that illustrate his concern that proper care by Dr. 
McQueen was not given. (See# Exhibit "B"# to Plaintiff's Response 
To Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment, Discharge Summary, 7-
14-89, from Dr. Home, [highlighted sections]; Exhibit "C", to 
Plaintiff's Response To Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment, 
November 20, 1991 letter from Dr. Home to Social Security 
Administration commenting on secondary infection after 
first [McQueen] surgery; and, Exhibit "D", to Plaintiff's 
Response To Defendants Motion For Summary Judgment, February 24, 
1990 letter from Dr. Home to Hartford Insurance). Those 
Exhibits, "B", "C", and "D", were over a period of time from Dr. 
Home's first visit/surgery through late in 1991, a period of 
nearly two and one-half years. Through all of that time, 
Plaintiff states that Dr. Home either directly told her, or 
clearly inferred, that the "secondary infection" in Plaintiff#s 
knee that precipitated her problems, was the result of Dr. 
McQueen allowing the open wound on her knee to stay open. 
Plaintiff had reasonably relied upon the fact that 
her surgeon and treating physician, Dr. Home, would testify as 
to those events and causes, as he had stated to her from the 
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beginning. The first time Dr. Home said he would not testify is 
in his September 11, 1992 letter to Plaintiff's attorney, such 
time being approximately one and one-half months after the 
deadline for expert designation, and two and one-half months 
before the scheduled trial. 
The cases set forth in the Addendum, i.e.. Hill v. 
Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ap. 1992); Christenson v. Jewkes, 
761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988); Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. 
v. Leisure Sports Incorporated, 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987); 
Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323; and Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 
917 (Utah App. 1989), are all instructive, but none are on point 
with the facts of the instant case. They can all be distinguished 
in that none of those cases involved a factual circumstance 
where, as here, (1) no continuances had been previously requested 
by Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff had not disobeyed any court 
scheduling or other order; (3) a timely designated expert who was 
also Plaintiff's treating physician and surgeon had, without 
Plaintiff's knowledge, supplied an affidavit to opposing counsel 
saying he would not testify, and on the same date inform 
Plaintiff's counsel by letter for the first time that he would 
not testify; (4) Defendants knew who Plaintiff's designated 
expert was and didn't attempt to depose him until September, when 
at that same time, Defendant obtained an affidavit from 
Plaintiff's expert, without informing Plaintiff that contact was 
going to be made with Plaintiff's designated expert. 
Hill v. Dickerson is instructive in that the Plaintiff in 
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Dlckerson had previously asked for and obtained continuances of 
the trial based upon not having a designated expert, had failed 
to timely respond to discovery, had violated the court's 
Scheduling Order, and orally moved the court for another 
continuance. In the instant case, Plaintiff had asked for no 
continuances, timely and pursuant to court order designated her 
expert and was moving toward trial when, after the expert 
designation cutoff date Plaintiff's expert supplies an affidavit 
to Defendants stating he would not testify for Plaintiff. It was 
at that point in time that Plaintiff requested for the first time 
a continuance and the opportunity to designate a replacement 
expert. 
None of the circumstances that existed in the Dickerson case 
existed in the instant case, and yet a careful reading of the 
Dickerson case suggests that it was those conditions that 
supported the finding that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. In this case, 
Defendant would not have been prejudiced as Defendant had not 
even taken Plaintiff's expert's deposition when the expert 
announced he would not testify. A continuance of the trial date 
and designation of another expert would have visited no hardship 
or prejudice upon Defendants in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Since none of the conditions existed in this case that 
existed in the Dickerson case, or that existed in any of the 
other cited cases, the court erred in dismissing this case with 
7 
prejudice without granting the Plaintiff the opportunity to 
replace her designated expert. The case should be remanded to the 
trial court with the instruction to allow Plaintiff 90 days in 
which to designate her expert and allow Defendants to take 
his/her deposition# before trial. 
Dated this l<Q day of May, 1993. 
J. Ray Bar 
Attorney f 
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8 
ADDENDUM 
9 
308 Utah 839 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
examined, even if they occur outside Utah. 
See Tummurru, 802 P.2d at 718-19. 
Here, CBI's customers intended to pur-
chase fully assembled tanks permanently 
installed on real estate. Whether that real 
estate was located in this or another state 
is not relevant as to CBI's status as a real 
property contractor. 
CBI also argues that imposing Utah 
sales tax on CBI's purchases of steel mate-
rials in Utah subjects CBI to taxation by 
two states on the same transaction, that is, 
taxation by Utah and taxation by the state 
where the tanks are installed. CBI con-
tends that this amounts to double taxation 
in violation of the commerce clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
In support of its position, CBI relies on 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 
U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 
(1977), and Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 
252, 109 S.Ct. 582, 102 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989). 
In our view, those cases do not control the 
issue here. Those cases dealt with the 
constitutionality of different types of taxes 
that call into play different legal principles. 
Complete Auto Transit involved a Mis-
sissippi statute that imposed a tax "for the 
privilege of . . . doing business" in the 
state. The company that the state taxed 
was engaged in interstate commerce. The 
United States Supreme Court upheld Mis-
sissippi's tax and overruled an earlier case, 
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 
340 U.S. 602, 71 S.Ct. 508, 95 L.Ed. 573 
(1951), which held that a state tax on the 
privilege of doing business was per se un-
constitutional when applied to interstate 
commerce. Cases following Complete 
Auto have established a four-part test for 
determining when a tax will be sustained 
against a commerce clause challenge: 
[A] state tax will withstand scrutiny un-
der the Commerce Clause if "[(1)] the 
tax is applied to an activity with a sub-
stantial nexus with the taxing State, 
[ (2) ] is fairly apportioned, [ (3) ] does not 
discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and [ (4) ] is fairly related to the 
services provided by the State." 
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. at 257, 109 
S.Ct. at 586 (quoting Complete Auto Tran-
sit, 430 U.S. at 279, 97 S.Ct. at 1079). 
[8] This test does not apply to the in-
stant case because Utah did not tax an out-
of-state transaction or even a transaction in 
interstate commerce. See McLeod v. J.E. 
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 64 S.Ct 1023, 
88 L.Ed. 1304 (1944). The transactions 
Utah taxed were CBI's purchases of steel 
materials from Utah vendors. The transac-
tions occurred solely within this state, and 
the goods that were subject to the transac-
tions were all used within the state by the 
taxpayer. Utah did not tax the use of a 
particular product manufactured outside 
the state but used within the state, see, 
e.g., D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 
U.S. 24, 108 S.Ct. 1619, 100 L.Ed.2d 21 
(1988), nor did it tax a sale in another state. 
The installation of the finished tanks in 
other states does not affect the local na-
ture of the sales transactions, nor does it 
make CBI's purchase of materials in Utah 
subject to apportionment, even though CBI 
paid a use tax to the state where the tanks 
were assembled and installed. 
CBI argues that because California may 
impose a use tax when the tanks are in-
stalled in California, imposition of the Utah 
sales tax may result in double taxation. 
This argument is based on a 1941 Califor-
nia Supreme Court ruling that steel materi-
als purchased by CBI from out-of-state 
sources for use in the fabrication of tanks 
in California or for inventory for use in 
California as business required were sub-
ject to the California use tax. Chicago 
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal.2d 
162, 119 P.2d 945 (1941) (per curiam). 
[9] The short answer to CBI's argu-
ment lies in the Multistate Tax Compact 
Both Utah and California are members of 
the Multistate Tax Commission, and both 
have adopted the Multistate Tax Compact 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-22-1 (1974 & Supp. 
1985) (currently codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-801 (1987)); Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code 
§§ 38001, 38006 (West 1979 & Supp.1992). 
Article V of the Compact provides: 
Elements of Sales and Use 
Tax Laws Tax Credit 
1. Each purchaser liable for a use tax 
on tangible personal property shall be 
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entitled to full credit for the combined law or rule" merely on a letter written to a 
amount or amounts of legally imposed taxpayer asserting the Commission's posi-
sales or use taxes paid by him with re- tion on an arguable question of law. The 
spect to the same property to another Commission's letter did not constitute a 
State and any subdivision thereof. The rule or law, and CBI's disregard of the 
credit shall be applied first against the letter did not, therefore, constitute an in-
amount of any use tax due the State, and tentional disregard of the law. In our 
any unused portion of the credit shall view, the dispute as to CBI's liability for 
then be applied against the amount of sales taxes was a good faith dispute, even 
any use tax due a subdivision. though CBI's position was wrong. Wheth-
Under this article, California, in imposing a e r a taxpayer is a real property contractor 
use tax, must give credit against that tax for sales tax purposes usually is fact sensi-
for any Utah sales tax levied, since "prece- tive. The issue in this case turned on facts 
dence in liability shall prevail over prece- that reasonably support either party's posi-
dence in payment." Resolution of Multi- tion. In addition, the taxes were imposed 
state Tax Commission (1980). According- for transactions that occurred beginning 
ly, the imposition of the Utah sales tax in October 1, 1983, five months before the 
this case should not result in double taxa- date of the letter. In short, the Commis-
tion. If it does, the remedy lies in the state sion erred in imposing the penalty. 
that seeks to impose a tax having that The tax assessment is affirmed. The 
effect. imposition of the penalty is reversed. 
PENALTY 
CBI asserts that the Commission erred in 
imposing a 15% penalty pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 5^-1-^0l(3)(b) (1987). That 
provision states, "If any underpayment of 
tax is due to intentional disregard of law or 
rule, the penalty is 15% of the underpay-
ment." The Commission ruled that CBI 
was guilty of "intentional disregard of law 
or rule as made known to it by way of the 
letter from the Commission dated February 
29, 1984." 
Although CBI did not comply with the 
Commission's demand in the February 29 
letter, we do not believe that constituted an 
"intentional disregard of law or rule" as 
that term is used by the statute. When the 
letter was sent, CBI's status as a real 
property contractor was arguable. Indeed, 
the Commission states in its brief, "The 
letter evidences a long standing disagree-
ment between the Auditing Division and 
Petitioner regarding Utah sales tax." 
1101 The Utah tax laws establish proce-
dures for resolving good faith disputes be-
tween the Commission and taxpayers. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-30-1 to -5 (Supp. 
1985) (currently §§ 59-1-501 to -505 (1987 
&• Supp. 1991)). The Commission cannot 
base a finding of "intentional disregard of 
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ., and 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
(o | KEY NUMMt SYSTEM! 
Gina M. HILL, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Dr. Carl DICKERSON, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 920271-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 9, 1992. 
Patient filed dental malpractice suit 
against dentist. The First District Court, 
Box Elder County, W. Brent West, J., dis-
missed patient's case with prejudice, and 
she appealed. The Court of Appeals, Rus-
son, J., held that: (1) denial of patient's 
motion for continuance was not an abuse of 
discretion; (2) trial court's refusal to allow 
patient to designate new witnesses did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion; and (3) 
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patient's dilatory conduct justified dismiss-
al of her case with prejudice. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., concurred in part and con-
curred in result in part, and filed opinion. 
1. Appeal and Error «^966(1) 
Pretrial Procedure «=»713 
Trial court has substantial discretion in 
deciding whether to grant continuances and 
will not be reversed on appeal unless it has 
abused that discretion by acting unreason-
ably. 
2. Pretrial Procedure «=726 
Trial court's refusal to grant patient a 
continuance in dental malpractice action 
was not abuse of discretion, where court 
had already granted one continuance and 
second request was solely due to patient's 
own failure to retain and designate new 
expert witness in timely manner. 
3. Appeal and Error «=>97<K2) 
Appellate court will not reverse trial 
court's determination on admissibility of 
evidence absent abuse of discretion impact-
ing party's substantial rights; it is not 
abuse of discretion for trial court to refuse 
to admit evidence which is not timely pro-
vided to opposing party, contrary to court's 
instruction. 
4. Pretrial Procedure «=>3 
Patient's untimely designation of new 
expert and fact witnesses in dental mal-
practice action violated trial court's orders 
and therefore, trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting dentist's motion in 
limine to preclude patient from calling 
these new witnesses. 
5. Pretrial Procedure «=*46 
Dismissal of dental malpractice case 
with prejudice was justified by patient's 
dilatory conduct and failure to name wit-
nesses until a few days prior to trial. 
Douglas M. Durbano (argued) and Wal-
ter T. Merrill, Ogden, for plaintiff and ap-
pellant. 
David G. Williams (argued) and Terence 
L. Rooney, Snow, Christensen & Marti-
neau, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellee. 
Before GARFF, ORME and RUSSON, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Gina M. Hill appeals from the district 
court's order dismissing her case with prej-
udice. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In March 1990, Gina M. Hill filed a com-
plaint against Dr. Carl Dickerson, alleging 
dental malpractice arising from treatment 
she received from February through April 
1986. 
The matter was originally set for trial on 
April 10, 1991. Two days before trial, Hill 
moved for a continuance of the trial on the 
ground that her expert witness, her new 
treating dentist, had declined to testify. 
Hill, acknowledging the need for expert 
testimony in order to establish her prima 
facie case, represented at that time that 
she had two other possible expert witness-
es and would soon decide who would be 
called to testify. 
On April 9, 1991, the district court grant-
ed Hill's motion and ordered the parties to 
exchange new expert witness lists, identify-
ing their expert witnesses, by April 19, 
1991. There was no provision in the dis-
trict court's order for additional time to 
identify new fact witnesses. The district 
court further ordered that all discovery be 
completed twenty days before the new trial 
date of August 26, 1991. 
On April 19, 1991, Dickerson served his 
expert list in accordance with the district 
court's order. On April 23, Hill's attorney 
contacted Dickerson's attorney and re-
quested that Hill be allowed to defer retain-
ing and designating her expert witness 
while settlement was being explored. 
Dickerson's attorney agreed. 
Settlement efforts continued until June 
28, 1991, at which time a mediation confer 
ence was scheduled. 
fused to participate in that conference. Af-
ter June 28, no further efforts at settle-
ment were pursued. 
On August 19, 1991, Hill sent a new 
witness list to Dickerson, naming a new 
expert witness and six additional fact wit-
nesses, never previously identified. In re-
sponse, Dickerson filed a motion in limine 
to preclude Hill from calling these new 
witnesses. At a hearing on August 26, 
Hill's attorney again admitted that expert 
testimony would be required in order for 
Hill to establish her prima facie case, stat-
ing that "for us to be precluded from hav-
ing an expert . . . defeats our entire case." 
The district court granted Dickerson's 
motion on the basis that Hill's list was 
untimely and in violation of the court's 
April order. Moreover, the court found 
that Dickerson would be "seriously preju-
diced" if the witnesses were allowed to 
testify. Hill orally moved for another con-
tinuance, which was denied. The district 
court then dismissed Hill's case with preju-
dice. 
Hill appeals, claiming that the district 
court erred in: (1) denying her oral motion 
for a continuance, (2) granting Dickerson's 
motion in limine, and (3) dismissing her 
case with prejudice. 
I. MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
111 The trial court has substantial dis-
cretion in deciding whether to grant contin-
uances, Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988), and will not be 
reversed on appeal unless it has abused 
that discretion by acting unreasonably. 
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26 
(Utah App.1989). 
(2) In the case at bar, Hill has failed to 
demonstrate that the district court's action 
in denying her oral motion for a continu-
ance in August 1991 was an unreasonable 
action by the district court meriting rever-
sal as an abuse of discretion. To the con-
I- Nor docs it matter that the parties agreed 
between themselves to allow Hill further time to 
designate her new expert witness. First, a court 
has the right to control its own calendar. See 
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However, Hill re- trary, the fact that the district court had 
already granted Hill one continuance in 
April weighs heavily in favor of the court's 
decision. Moreover, Hill's second request 
for a continuance was solely due to her 
own failure to retain and designate a new 
expert witness in a timely manner. Under 
such circumstances, we find no abuse in 
the district court's denial of Hill's oral mo-
tion in August See id. at 926. 
II. MOTION IN LIMINE 
[31 We will not reverse a trial court's 
determination on the admissibility of evi-
dence absent an abuse of discretion impact-
ing a party's substantial rights. Hardy v. 
Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah App.1989). 
It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial 
court to refuse to admit "evidence which is 
not timely provided to the opposing party 
contrary to the court's instruction." Id. at 
925. 
141 In the present case, Hill's action in 
naming a new expert witness and six addi-
tional fact witnesses on August 19, 1991, 
was clearly contrary to the district court's 
instruction. First, Hill's action violated the 
court's April 9, 1991, order directing the 
parties to identify their expert witnesses by 
April 19, 1991. Secondly, Hill attempted to 
name several additional fact witnesses, de-
spite the fact that the court's April order 
contained no provision for additional time 
to identify new fact witnesses. Thirdly, 
Hill's action also was inconsistent with the 
district court's order that all discovery be 
completed on August 6, 1991, twenty days 
before the new trial date. Lastly, the court 
found that to allow the newly named wit-
nesses to testify would "seriously preju-
dice" Dickerson, a fact which has not been 
challenged by Hill on appeal. Thus, since 
Hill's untimely designation of her new ex-
pert witness violated the district court's 
instruction, the court's action in granting 
Dickerson'8 motion in limine clearly did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. See id.1 
Charlie Brown Constr. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App.) (A trial court is not 
bound by a mere agreement between the parties 
which has not been incorporated in an order 
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III. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
15] Although dismissal with prejudice is 
a harsh penalty, there are numerous cases 
in which the Utah appellate courts have 
held that a party's dilatory conduct justi-
fied such action. In Max/ield v. Fishier, 
538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the Utah Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal with prejudice based on the plain-
tiff's "inexcusable neglect in failing to pre-
pare and prosecute her claim with reason-
able diligence." Id. at 1324-25. Similarly, 
in Charlie Brown Constr. v. Leisure 
Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987), we 
held that, while a trial court must afford a 
plaintiff "an opportunity to be heard and to 
do justice," id. at 1371 (quoting Westing-
house Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
1975)), it was not error for the trial court to 
dismiss the plaintiffs' case with prejudice 
due to their abuse of that opportunity 
through dilatory conduct. Id. According-
ly, we find that Hill had ample opportunity 
to litigate her case here, but abused such 
opportunity, and thus we affirm the district 
court's dismissal of her case with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is to effect total fairness for all 
parties in a suit. To allow one party to 
have continuance after continuance to the 
prejudice of the other party would be pat-
ently unfair. This is especially true when 
such continuances are being granted for 
the plaintiff who triggers the time con-
straints of litigation by bringing the suit in 
the first place. It is equally unfair to allow 
a party to name new witnesses several 
days before trial. Allowing a party to do 
so at the last minute not only prejudices 
the other party by foreclosing adequate 
opportunity to depose said witnesses and 
where that agreement "attempts to wrest from 
the court control of its own calendar." Id. at 
1371 (citations omitted).), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1987). Moreover, the agreement in 
the case at bar was not made until April 26, 
1991, several days after the deadline set by the 
district court for the designation of experts had 
already passed. Lastly, to rule otherwise would 
find opposing witnesses to respond to the 
new testimony, but also encourages parties 
to do so as a trial strategy. Accordingly, 
we affirm the district court's order dismiss-
ing Hill's case with prejudice. 
GARFF, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (concurring in part and 
concurring in the result in part): 
I concur in parts I and III of the court's 
opinion. Because I have some trepidation 
about the majority's refusal to even consid-
er, as a fact in mitigation, counsel's infor-
mal stipulation to extend plaintiffs time 
for supplementing her witness list, I concur 
only in the result of part II. 
While the trial court may surely be con-
cerned for its calendar and may impose 
reasonable deadlines to insure the calendar 
and its business are not disrupted, counsel 
ought to have some flexibility to resolve 
minor matters between themselves. In-
deed, limited judicial resources are pre-
served by not requiring counsel to bother 
the court for approval every time they per 
ceive some need to massage the prelimi-
nary details of a scheduling order. 
In this case, with trial still four months 
off, no risk of disruption was posed to the 
court's basic schedule by permitting plain-
tiff to defer supplementing her witness list 
while settlement discussions progressed, at 
least for some reasonable time. To require 
counsel to reduce their understanding to 
writing and submit it to the court for an 
order of approval would not only require 
judge time to be expended on a pro forma 
matter, but also would require some part 
of counsel's time to be diverted from the 
salutary business of settlement discus-
sions. But had such a stipulation been 
prepared and submitted, I have no doubt 
the court would have signed off on it, at 
least for a specific period, reasonable in 
encourage parties to adopt a trial strategy of 
persuading their opponents to allow postpone-
ment of designation of expert witness while 
settlement is being pursued, only to designate 
an expert a few days before trial, at which time 
the opponent would have no time to depose the 
said expert or to find witnesses to oppose the 
new testimony. 
duration, that would not jeopardize the dis-
covery cut-off date. 
I would prefer that the informal exten-
sion in this case not be dismissed out of 
hand. Rather, I would prefer to premise 
our decision at least partly on this basis: 
When settlement efforts terminated defini-
tively on June 28, the extension terminated 
as well by its terms. It became incumbent 
on plaintiffs counsel immediately to des-
ignate his new expert. This he failed to do. 
Instead, nearly two months went by before 
HILL v. DICKERSON 
at*Mft39 *M 309 (Utah App. 1992) 
Utah 313 
he finally got around to submitting the new 
expert's name—a scant week prior to trial 
and after the discovery cut-off. Yes, this 
violated the terms of the scheduling order. 
Just as important in my view, it also violat-
ed the terms of counsel's stipulation. 
SYSTIM> 
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Creditor appealed The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J , held that the District Court did 
not err by allowing debtors' expert witness 
to testify concerning fair market value of 
subject property 
Affirmed 
Zimmerman, J , concurred in result and 
filed opinion 
1 Pretrial Procedure <*=»713 
Trial courts have substantia] discretion 
in deciding whether to grant continuances 
Rules Civ Proc, Rule 40(b) 
2 Pretrial Procedure «=»45 
Debtors' expert witness could testify 
concerning fair market value of subject 
property, in deficiency judgment action 
brought after nonjudicial trust deed sale of 
undeveloped real property, even though 
debtors did not inform creditor that witness 
would testify until five days before trial 
and even though creditor did not receive 
witness' report until one day before trial, 
witness was made available to creditor ei 
ther for informal interview or for deposi 
taon, and creditor was not prejudicially un 
prepared to conduct adequate cross-exami 
nation in that only issue in action was value 
of subject property U C A 1953, 57-1-32 
Scott W Cameron, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant 
H Hal Visick, Provo, for defendants and 
appellees 
STEWART, Justice 
The plaintiff, Cape Trust, appeals a judg-
ment entered on a jury verdict in favor of 
the defendants, J Paul and Loma Jewkes, 
m an action for a deficiency judgment pur-
suant to Utah Code Ann § 57-1-82 (1986), 
following a nonjudicial trust deed sale of 
undeveloped real property 
1. Section 57-1-32 requires that a complaint 
seeking a deficiency judgment must state the 
amount of the indebtedness, the amount for 
The defendants owed $264,000 on a loan 
made by the plaintiff The plaintiff com 
menced this action seeking a deficiency 
judgment for $109,000, which was owed 
after a nonjudicial sale of 38 78 acres of 
undeveloped property which secured the 
loan The plaintiff purchased the property 
at the trustee's sale for $100,000 The 
complaint alleged that, according to Cape 
Trust's appraisal, the market value of the 
property was $155,000 or $4,000 per acre' 
Subsequent to filing the complaint, the 
plaintiff made various discovery requests 
in September and November, 1983, and in 
February, 1984 The defendants answered 
the September and November requests, 
they did not answer the February, 1984 
request 
At a January 13, 1984 pretrial confer-
ence, the court set the case for trial on 
March 13, 1984, and ruled that discovery 
could continue up to ten days before trial 
The pretrial order stated that neither unfin 
ished discovery nor failure to discover 
would be grounds for continuance of the 
trial date 
On March 8, 1984, five days before trial, 
the defendants informed the plaintiff that 
they intended to call as an expert witness 
Mr Gerald Higgs, an appraiser who would 
testify concerning the fair market value of 
the property, which he had determined to 
be approximately $685,000, or $17,700 per 
acre The defendants' counsel offered to 
make this witness available to the plain 
tiff 8 counsel despite the expiration of the 
discovery period 
The day before trial, the defendants gave 
the plaintiff a copy of the appraiser's re-
port, and the plaintiff thereafter asked the 
defendants for a continuance Although 
both the plaintiffs and the defendants' 
counsel agreed to a continuance, the trial 
judge refused to grant one Just before 
trial the plaintiff renewed the motion for a 
continuance and, in the alternative, moved 
to preclude the testimony of Gerald Higgs, 
which the property was sold and the fair mar 
ket value of the property on the date of the sale 
pursuant to the sanction provisions of Rule 
37(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure The 
court denied the plaintiffs motion to con-
tinue and later, dunng the trial, denied the 
motion to strike 
At trial, the plaintiff presented the testi-
mony of its expert appraiser, who ap-
praised the value of the land at approxi-
mately $4,000 per acre, or $155,000 total 
The defendants' expert, Mr Higgs, after 
adjusting for the time interval between the 
date of foreclosure and the date of the 
appraisal, estimated the fair market value 
of the land to be approximately $622,775, 
or $16,070 per acre Paul Jewkes, one of 
the defendants, also an expert appraiser, 
testified that the value of the property was 
approximately $16,500 per acre, or $639,375 
total 
The jury was asked to return a special 
verdict fixing the fan* market value of the 
property on the date of the foreclosure 
sale The jury found the value to be $9,600 
per acre, or $372,288 total Because the 
value of the property was found to be in 
excess of the amount of the debt owed, the 
court entered judgment in favor of the 
defendants 
After the trial, the plaintiff brought a 
timely motion for a new trial based on Rule 
69(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, claiming that it was surprised by the 
defendants' expert witness, Higgs, who 
had not been identified in the defendants' 
answers to the pretrial discovery requests 
The motion for a new trial was denied, and 
this appeal followed 
On appeal, Cape Trust contends that the 
trial court abused its discretion by denying 
the continuances which were requested the 
day before and the day of trial Cape 
Trust also contends that the trial court 
erred in failing to grant a motion for a new 
trial due to the surprise caused by late 
notification that Gerald Higgs would testi-
2. Cape Trust does not contend that the defend 
ants' counsel acted in bad faith The third set 
of interrogatories submitted by Cape Trust re-
quested, among other things, the identity of 
every witness the defendants intended to call 
CHRISTENSON v. JEWKES 
Cite M 761 PJd 1379 (Utah 1988) 
Utah 
fy Because both of these contentio 
volve the same issue, 1 e, the propr* 
the trial court's allowing Higgs to U 
we shall discuss them together 
[1] Trial courts have substantial c1 
tion in deciding whether to grant c 
uances Utah RCivP Rule 40(b) 
also State v Humpherys, 707 P2< 
(Utah 1985), Griffiths v Hammon 
P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977), Sharp v Gtan 
ts, 63 Utah 249, 225 P 337 (1924) Su 
ly, both the granting of, and the ref 
to grant, a new trial is a matter left t 
discretion of the trial judge, and that 
sion will be reversed only if the judg 
abused that discretion by acting unre 
ably Batty v Mitchell, 575 P2d 
1043 (Utah 1978), Smith v Shreeve 
P 2d 1261 (Utah 1976), Page v Utah I 
Fiie tm Co, 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P % 
(1964) Thorley v Kolob Fish & C 
Club, 13 Utah 2d 294, 373 P 2d 574 (1 
[2] Cape Trust contends that it 
prejudiced by Higgs' testimony The 
was concerned with only one issue at 
the fair market value of the land 
Trust asserts that since it did not kno 
the defendants' expert until five dayi 
fore trial and did not receive his n 
until one day before trial, it did not 
adequate time to evaluate comparable i 
which were used as the basis for th< 
pert's testimony concerning the valu 
the land Cape Trust further claims 
because it had inadequate time to prej 
it was unable to conduct an adequate c 
examination of the defendants' expert 
ness* 
The argument is unconvincing 
though Cape Trust did not know 
Higgs would testify until after the tim< 
discovery closed, the expert was u 
available to the plaintiff either for an u 
mal interview or for a deposition 
The record indicates that the defendants' < 
sel provided such information to the plaii 
counsel as soon as it was determined that I 
would be a witness for the defendants. 
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plaintiff did not take advantage of either 
option. 
Further, since the only issue in the case 
was the value of the land and the plaintiff 
had to prepare and present evidence on 
that issue anyway, the plaintiff surely was 
not prejudicially unprepared to conduct an 
adequate cross-examination. In fact, the 
record reveals that Cape Trust conducted a 
very thorough examination of Mr. Higgs. 
He was questioned closely concerning both 
his written report and the properties listed 
as comparable sales in the report. Fur-
thermore, Cape Trust recalled its own ex-
pert appraiser as a rebuttal witness. That 
appraiser testified concerning the proper-
ties listed in the Higgs appraisal. Cape 
Trust's appraiser was familiar with at least 
five of the comparable sales listed in the 
Higgs appraisal. In short, the prejudice 
claimed by Cape Trust is simply not vali-
dated by an examination of the record. 
Finally, one additional factor tends to 
support the conclusion that Cape Trust was 
not prejudiced by the introduction of 
Higgs' testimony. The jury found the val-
ue of the land to be $9,600 per acre. Un-
disputed testimony was given that the 
property in question had sold for $9,000 per 
acre in 1977, some six years before the 
valuation at issue in this case. The jury 
therefore had a figure for the value of the 
land which was independent of the apprais-
ers' reports and could well have been a 
basis for the verdict In short, Cape Trust 
has demonstrated no error and no preju-
dice. 
AFFIRMED. 
HALL, CJ„ HOWE, Associate CJ., 
and DURHAM, J., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in 
the result): 
I agree that the decision below should be 
affirmed. However, I join the result 
reached by the majority only because any 
error committed by the trial court in unrea-
sonably refusing either to grant a continu-
ance or to exclude the evidence made 
known to Christenson immediately before 
trial in violation of the court's orders has 
not been shown to have sufficiently under-
mined the outcome so as to lead me to 
believe that the error was harmful under 
the harmless error test of Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 61 and Utah Rule of Evi-
dence 103(a). See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 
P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987); Redevelopment 
Agency of Roy v. Jones, 743 P.2d 1233, 
1235 (Utah Ct. App.1987); see also State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 91&-20 (Utah 1987). 
(p f « T W U H W « SYSTEM^ 
Sandra MISKIN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Marianne CARTER, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 20587. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 25, 1988. 
Following automobile accident, injured 
party brought suit seeking damages and 
punitive damages. The District Court, 
Third District, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., granted defendant partial sum-
mary judgment on punitive damages issue. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court, Zimmer-
man, J., held that: (1) mere presence of 
legal minimum for establishing drunk driv-
ing combined with nothing more than negli-
gent conduct was insufficient to warrant 
imposition of punitive damages, and (2) un-
der some circumstances punitive damages 
could be warranted by drunk driving. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles *=»245(1) 
Mere presence of legal minimum for 
establishing driving while intoxicated, com-
bined with nothing more than negligent 
conduct, was insufficient to put issue of 
punitive damages in a personal injury suit 
arising from motor vehicle accident to the 
jury; driver had consumed three or four 
drinks more than four hours prior to driv-
ing and had entered intersection after light 
had changed. 
2. Automobiles «=»249 
Under some circumstances, manner in 
which a vehicle is operated, when con-
sidered in light of driver's degree of intoxi-
cation and driver's past behavior patterns, 
may warrant punitive damages. 
MISKIN v. CARTER 
Cite M 761 PJd 1378 (Utah IMS) 
Utah 13 
G. Steven Sullivan, Robert J. DeBry, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant 
Roger Christensen, Roger Fairbanks, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiff Sandra Miskin appeals from a 
grant of partial summary judgment dis-
missing her claim for punitive damages. 
That claim was based on an accident aris-
ing from defendant Marianne Carter's op-
eration of a motor vehicle while legally 
intoxicated. We affirm. 
The record regarding Carter's conduct 
was fully developed below through dis-
covery. We consider those facts in the 
light most favorable to Miskin. See, e.g., 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 
1983). Carter had consumed three or four 
alcoholic drinks on the day in question. 
After drinking, Carter had a friend drive 
her car back to their place of employment, 
and then Carter waited four hours before 
driving the car herself. When she did 
drive, she entered an intersection immedi-
ately after the light had turned red and 
collided with Miskin's car. Miskin sued, 
claiming that Carter had injured her by 
driving her car negligently and recklessly 
while intoxicated. Miskin sought gem 
and punitive damages. 
Carter admitted her negligence and 
cepted liability for Miskin's general di 
ages but moved for partial summary ju< 
ment on the issue of punitive damag 
The trial court granted the motion, ruli 
that, as a matter of law, bare evidence 
legal intoxication combined with sim] 
negligence in the operation of a motor ' 
hide, without more, is insufficient to si 
port a claim for punitive damages. 
The Utah cases that have attempted 
define the legal standard for awarding f 
nitive damages in tort cases appear to 
somewhat in conflict, as noted recently 1 
the Utah Court of Appeals in Biswell 
Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 83-84 (Utah CtAp 
1987). In false imprisonment cases, v 
have applied a "malice in fact" or "actu 
malice" standard. See McFarland 
Skaggs Companies, 678 P.2d 298, 3( 
(Utah 1984). In other cases, we have a 
plied the "implied malice" or "malice i 
law" standard, often characterized as reel 
less disregard for the rights of anothe 
See, e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleun 
Inc., 667 P.2d 267, 277-78 (Utah 1982 
Still other cases state that either the "acti 
al malice" or the "implied malice" standar 
applies in determining the propriety of 
punitive damages award. See, e.g., Atkir< 
Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. t 
Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985 
We note that these conflicts in the states 
standards may be more apparent than real 
at least when the legal and factual context 
in which the standards have been enunciat 
ed are taken into account. Be that as i 
may, we have no occasion to address thes< 
precedents because, whatever may be th< 
case with respect to the standards appro 
priate for other causes of action, today w< 
have clarified the standard for imposing 
punitive damages in drunken driving cases, 
In Johnson v. Rogers, — P.2d , No. 
20622, slip op. (Utah August 25, 1988), wc 
settled on the "knowing and reckless dis-
regard for the rights of others" standard. 
The question is whether that standard is 
satisfied here. 
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ing and insubstantial that a reasonable per-
son could not possibly have reached a ver-
dict beyond a reasonable doubt" State v. 
Tanner, 675 P 2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983). 
Clearly the State's evidence supports the 
trial court's finding. Therefore, we affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
GREENWOOD and GARFF, JJ., 
concur. 
NIMMt SVSTEM> 
CHARLIE BROWN CONSTRUCTION 
CO., INC., a Nevada Corporation, Char-
lie Brown and Carina Brown, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
LEISURE SPORTS INCORPORATED, a 
Nevada Corporation, West Village Unit 
No. One, Mt. Holly Recreation Commu-
nity, Conrad H. Koning, and Amy J. 
Koning, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 860119-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 17, 1987. 
Plaintiffs appealed an order of the Dis-
trict Court, Beaver County, J. Harlan 
Burns, J., denying their motion to set aside 
dismissal of their complaint. The Court of 
Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) rule gov-
erning dismissal for failure to prosecute 
merely permits, and does not require, mo-
tion by defendant for dismissal; (2) parties' 
prior stipulation to postpone any pretrial 
conference which was communicated to and 
filed with court did not prevent trial court 
from dismissing suit for failure to prose-
cute; regardless of whether trial court nev-
er knew of, ignored, or simply forgot about 
stipulation, plaintiffs themselves failed to 
comply with intent of stipulation by failing 
to move for order compelling discovery af-
ter additional 30-day period to respond to 
interrogatories had expired and no re-
sponse had been received; and (3) trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by dis-
missing suit with prejudice on the merits 
for failure to prosecute; trial court provid-
ed plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard and 
to do justice, and plaintiffs nevertheless 
abused their opportunity through dilatory 
conduct 
Affirmed. 
1. Pretrial Procedure «=»674 
Rule governing dismissal for failure to 
prosecute merely permits, and does not re-
quire, motion by defendant for dismissal. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41(b). 
2. Stipulations «=»3 
Trial court is not necessarily bound by 
mere stipulation between parties which has 
not been incorporated in an order, where 
stipulation attempts to wrest from the 
court control of its own calendar. 
3. Stipulations «=>3 
Parties' prior stipulation to postpone 
any pretrial conference which was commu-
nicated to and filed with court did not pre-
vent trial court from dismissing suit for 
failure to prosecute; regardless of whether 
trial court never knew of, ignored, or sim-
ply forgot about stipulation, plaintiffs 
themselves failed to comply with intent of 
stipulation by failing to move for order 
compelling discovery after additional 30-
day period to respond to interrogatories 
had expired and no response had been re-
ceived. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 37. 
4. Pretrial Procedure «=>596 
Generally, law office delays or failures 
are unacceptable excuses for failure to 
prosecute. 
5. Pretrial Procedure *»587, 690 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by dismissing suit with prejudice on the 
merits for failure to prosecute; trial court 
provided plaintiffs an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice, and plaintiffs 
nevertheless abused their opportunity 
through dilatory conduct. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 41(b). 
CHARLIE BROWN CONST, v. LEISURE SPORTS 
Cite u 740 PJd 1968 (Utah App. 1967) 
Utah 1369 
Jackson Howard, Leslie W. Slaugh, Pro-
vo, for appellants. 
Russell J. Gallian, Gallian, Drake & 
Westfall, St. George, for respondents. 
Before JACKSON, 
ORME, JJ. 
BENCH and 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiffs appeal an order of the district 
court denying their motion to set aside the 
dismissal of their complaint. We affirm. 
Plaintiffs are the purchasers and owners 
of certain lots at Mount Holly Ski Resort. 
Defendants are the developers of the area. 
On June 15, 1981, plaintiffs filed a com-
plaint against defendants to compel comple-
tion of certain road improvements. At de-
fendants' request, plaintiffs posted a non-
resident cost bond pursuant to Utah 
R.Civ.P. 12(j). Defendants then filed their 
answer on July 6, 1981. 
Ten and one-half months later, on May 
27, 1982, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend 
their complaint and a notice to take defend-
ants Conrad and Amy Koning's depositions. 
At defendants' request, the depositions 
were postponed to July 9, 1982. On June 
14, a hearing was held on plaintiffs' motion 
to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs failed 
to appear and the motion was denied sub-
ject to renewal at a later date. On June 21, 
1982, John B. Maycock filed an appearance 
as defendants' co-counsel. Subsequently, 
defendants' original counsel, Scott J. Thor-
ley, withdrew. 
On July 9 and 16, 1982, defendants filed 
motions for protective orders requesting 
their depositions not be taken. Defendants 
based their motions on protective orders 
issued in concurrent federal litigation. The 
court never ruled on the motions, nor did 
plaintiffs pursue their requested deposi-
tions. Plaintiffs filed interrogatories with 
the court on April 4, 1983, nine months 
after defendants' motions for protective or-
ders. Plaintiffs' counsel mistakenly mailed 
a set of the interrogatories to Thorley, 
defendants' former counsel, who never for-
warded the interrogatories to Maycock. 
On December 5, 19<°° after eight more 
months of inactivity, \ • court sua sponte 
filed an order to show cause why the case 
should not be dismissed for failure to pros-
ecute. The court ordered both parties to 
appear on March 19, 1984. Failure to ap-
pear "[would] be considered as acqui-
escence to entry of an order of dismissal 
and the judgment [would] be entered by 
the Court without further notice to the 
parties." The court also filed a notice for a 
pre-trial hearing, also set for March 19, 
1984. Plaintiffs realized the error with the 
interrogatories and entered into a stipula-
tion with defendants allowing defendants 
thirty more days to respond. The stipula-
tion also gratuitously stated, "this matter 
should be stricken from the Court's Pre-
Trial Calendar until the parties have com-
pleted their discovery or until either party 
requests a Pre-Trial Conference." 
The morning of March 19, plaintiffs' 
counsel telephoned the trial court judge 
and informed him of the stipulation. The 
trial court excused the parties' absence and 
in a second order to show cause continued 
the pre-trial to April 16, 1984. A transmit-
tal letter, which referred to the telephone 
conversation and the stipulation, was filed 
on March 22. On April 16, 1984, the court 
again continued the matter for sixty days. 
A signed stipulation was filed on April 19, 
1984. On April 30, 1984, the trial court sua 
sponte mailed notices to the parties setting 
trial for June 18, 1984. Plaintiffs contact-
ed the trial court executive and explained 
the stipulation. The trial court executive, 
rather than vacating the date, sent revised 
notices changing the trial setting to a pre-
trial hearing. 
On June 15, 1984, plaintiffs' counsel per-
sonally spoke to the trial court judge in S t 
George. Counsel explained the stipulation 
and informed the judge a settlement was 
likely. The court allegedly excused the 
parties from appearing at the June 18 hear-
ing. However, when the matter was called 
on June 18 and neither party was present, 
the judge ordered the case dismissed. In a 
minute entry, the court stated: 
1370 Utah 740 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
This matter was called on hearing for a 
Pre-Trial Conference. No one appeared 
on behalf of either party. This matter 
had been set several times for pre-trial 
and no one had ever appeared. The 
Court ordered the matter dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits. The minute 
entry will serve as the Order of Dismis-
sal. A copy is *to be mailed to the respec-
tive parties. 
The court clerk mailed copies of the un-
signed minute entry to both parties on June 
28. 
Due to error, allegedly on the part of 
plaintiffs' counsel's secretary, the minute 
entry did not come to plaintiffs' counsel's 
attention until seven months later in Janu-
ary, 1985.1 When plaintiffs' counsel be-
came aware of the minute entry, he at-
tempted to consult with the trial court and 
defendants. Unable to do so, he filed a 
motion on February 25 to set aside the 
dismissal. At a hearing on March 18, 1985, 
the court reviewed the entire file and con-
sidered arguments of counsel.2 The court, 
noting plaintiffs' failure diligently to prose-
cute their lawsuit, affirmed the dismissal 
and entered orders accordingly. 
[1] On appeal, plaintiffs contend the tri-
al court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion 
to set aside the dismissal. Plaintiffs argue 
under Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b) the court has no 
authority to dismiss for failure to prose-
cute absent a motion by defendants. The 
rule states, "For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or comply with these rules or 
any order of court, a defendant may move 
for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him." The language in Rule 41(b) 
merely permits, not requires, a motion by 
defendant. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
Brasher Motor and Finance Co. v. 
Broum, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464, 464-
65 (1969), states, "In dismissing an action 
for want of prosecution, the court may 
proceed under [Rule 41(b) ], or it may, of its 
own motion, take action to that end." See 
1. During this seven month period, Maycock 
filed a notice of withdrawal and defendants 
Konings, in reliance on the minute entry, sold 
their shares in co-defendant Leisure Sports, Inc. 
also Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 768 
(Utah 1980). Under the comparable federal 
rule, the United States Supreme Court sim-
ilarly held: 
Neither the permissive language of the 
Rule—which merely authorizes a motion 
by the defendant—nor its policy requires 
us to conclude that it was the purpose of 
the Rule to abrogate the power of courts, 
acting on their own initiative, to clear 
their calendars of cases that have re-
mained dormant because of the inaction 
or dilatoriness of the parties seeking re-
lief. The authority of a court to dismiss 
sua sponte for lack of prosecution has 
generally been considered an "inherent 
power," governed not by rule or statute 
but by the control necessarily vested in 
courts to manage their own affairs so as 
to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases. 
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-
31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-89, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 
(1962). 
As stated in Lake Meredith Reservoir 
Co. v. Amity Mutual Irrigation Co., 698 
P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo.1985), "The burden is 
upon the plaintiff to prosecute a case in 
due course without unusual or unreason-
able delay." Plaintiffs are required "to 
prosecute their claims with due diligence, 
or accept the penalty of dismissal." Max-
field v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 
1975). Dismissal for failure to prosecute is 
a decision within the broad discretion of the 
trial court. This Court will not interfere 
with that decision unless it clearly appears 
that the court has abused its discretion and 
that there is a likelihood an injustice has 
been wrought. Department of Soc. Serv. 
v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 
1980). 
At the March 18 hearing on plaintiffs' 
motion to set aside the dismissal, the court 
reviewed the entire file. The court re-
viewed plaintiffs' ten and one-half months 
delay after defendants filed their answer 
2. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, argu-
ing their counsel never had been authorized to 
enter into any stipulation to delay the action. 
The claim is of questionable relevance and is 
not a factor in our decision. 
CHARLIE BROWN CONST, v. LEISURE SPORTS 
Cite as 740 P J d 13*8 (UtahApp. 1907) 
and plaintiffs' failure to attend the hearing Valente v. First Western 
on their motion to amend their complaint. 
The court reviewed plaintiffs' failure to 
pursue a ruling on defendants' motion for 
protective orders against the requested 
depositions. The court reviewed another 
ten month delay before plaintiffs pursued 
another discovery device, namely the inter-
rogatories. The court also reviewed eight 
months more of delay before plaintiffs dis-
covered defendants did not have the inter-
rogatories. Finally, and as noted by the 
court in its order denying plaintiffs' motion 
to set aside the dismissal, the court re-
viewed yet another eight months delay by 
plaintiffs from the time notification of the 
minute entry was received until they filed a 
motion to set aside the dismissal. 
[2] Plaintiffs argue the court erred in 
dismissing their action in light of the 
court's alleged excusal of both parties' ap-
pearance at the June 18 hearing. Plaintiffs 
contend the trial court was bound by the 
parties' prior stipulation to postpone any 
pre-trial conference which was communi-
cated to and filed with the court. How-
ever, a trial court is not necessarily bound 
by a mere stipulation between parties 
which has not been incorporated in an or-
der where the stipulation attempts to wrest 
from the court control of its own calendar. 
See Lake Meredith, 698 P.2d at 1346. 
[3] Regardless of whether the trial 
court never knew of, ignored, or simply 
forgot about the stipulation, plaintiffs 
themselves failed to comply with the intent 
of the stipulation. The primary purpose of 
the stipulation was to provide defendants 
an additional thirty days to respond to the 
interrogatories. When the thirty day peri-
od expired and no response had been re-
ceived, plaintiffs did not move under Utah 
R.Civ.P, 37 for an order compelling dis-
covery nor attempt in any way to move the 
case forward. 
[4] Plaintiffs do not claim the stipula-
tion as an excuse for any of their numerous 
delays. Rather, plaintiffs' counsel asserts 
secretarial error as an excuse for the delay 
after receipt of the minute entry. General-
ly, law office delays or failures are unac-
ceptable excuses for failure to prosecute 
Utah 
Savini 
700 (Ne Loan Ass'n, 528 P.2d 699, 
[5] Plaintiffs last argue the tria 
erred in dismissing their action with 
dice and on the merits. Rule 41(b) 
"Unless the court in its order for dii 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal und 
subdivision and any dismissal not pr 
for in this rule, other than a dismisi 
lack of jurisdiction or for improper 
or for lack of an indispensable party 
ates as an adjudication upon the m 
Plaintiffs cite three Utah Supreme 
cases which reversed a trial court's d 
sal with prejudice as an abuse of disci 
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2(i 
(Utah 1977) (motion to dismiss filed i 
same time as defendant's answer); 
Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 I 
1977) (delay due to settlement nej 
tions); Crystal Lime & Cement C 
Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 335 P.2d 624 ( 
(failure to consider counterclaims). 1 
three cases are readily distinguish 
The facts of this case are much clos< 
those of Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 
(Utah 1975). In Maxfield, the Utah 
preme Court affirmed a trial court's dig 
sal with prejudice against the plaintifl 
"inexcusable neglect in failing to pre 
and prosecute her claim with reason 
diligence." Id. at 1324-25. In the ins 
case, the trial court provided plaintiffs 
opportunity to be heard and to do justi 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paui 
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 
(Utah 1975). Plaintiffs neverthe 
abused their opportunity through dilat 
conduct. 
We therefore find no abuse of discret 
and affirm the trial court's order deny 
plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismisi 
Costs to defendants. 
ORME and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
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raised about the personal property being 
there until after controversy over the for-
feiture developed We are not persuaded 
that we should disagree with the view tak-
en by the trial court that the plaintiff did 
not, and could not, make a showing that 
this storage was of sufficient substance 
and materiality to justify its non-perform-
ance 
[5,6] Plaintiff's second contention is 
that on or about December 8, 1973, the 
Holts had orally agreed to a modification 
of the contract to allow for reduced pay-
ments until the personal property was re 
moved It says that the payment of $500 
on December 10th and the $1,000 paid on 
December 16th were made in accordance 
with that oral agreement In support of 
that claim plaintiff points to the fact that 
on the latter check there are the words, "as 
per agreement of 12-8-73" This, plaintiff 
argues, is a sufficient memorandum in 
writing to modify the original contract and 
satisfy the statute of frauds It is elemen-
tary that when a contract is required to be 
in writing, the same requirement applies 
with equal force to any alteration or modi-
fication thereof 4 More importantly here, 
any such modifying agreement must be 
sufficiently certain and unequivocal in its 
terms that the parties will understand what 
it is and what is to be done under i t 5 
Neither the check, nor the quoted notation 
thereon, make any such recitals and they 
therefore do not meet that requirement. 
[7] Plaintiff also claims, in the alterna-
tive, that the oral agreement is removed 
from the statute of frauds due to the equi-
table principle of part performance, which 
is part of our law by statute,6 and 
decision 7 The observations just made per-
4 See Sec 25-5-1, 3, Utah Code Ann 1053, 
and Coombs v Ouzouman, 24 Utah 2d 39, 4t>5 
P2d 356 (1970) Combined Metals v Bas 
tian, 71 Utah 535, 2<>7 P 1020 (1928) 
5 See Bough v Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 291, 
495 P2d 814 (1972) Birdzell v Utah Oil 
Refining Co, 121 Utah 412, 242 P2d 578 
(1952) 
6 Sec 25-5-8, Utah Code Ann 1953 
taming to oral modification also apply 
here The payments referred to could well 
be regarded as payments on the written 
contract and they do not unequivocally re-
late to any oral contract 
[8-10] Plaintiff's final argument is 
that it tendered the payments due under 
the contract on four separate occasions 
Its evidence relates to two occasions after 
the forfeiture had occurred. These are 
thus not material to the issues involved 
here With respect to the other two, these 
observations are pertinent A tender re-
quires that there be a bona fide, uncondi-
tional, offer of payment of the amount of 
money due, coupled with an actual produc 
tion of the money or its equivalent8 
What occurred was that plaintiff's presi-
dent discussed with the defendants the 
prospect that payment would be made un 
cer certain conditions But there was no 
actual tender of the amounts due under the 
contract within the foregoing definition, 
nor even a tender of such amounts due, 
less a reasonable and specific set-off for 
storage of the defendants property on the 
premises 
[11] The immutable proposition faced 
by the plaintiff in this case is this that 
unless there is some showing of legal ex 
cuse or justification for failure to perform 
the obligations of a contract, it must be en 
forced according to its terms • The facts 
of controlling significance are that when 
it took over the contract on July 18, 1973, 
it knew that it was assuming the duty to 
pay 13 days later, on August 1, $7,000 
principal, plus $1,600 interest, a total of 
$8,600, which obligation it did not meet It 
did make the payments listed above, aggre 
gating $7,500 paid by December 16, 1973, 
7 Holmgren Brothers, Inc v Ballard, Utah 
534 P2d 611 (1975), and authorities tited 
therein 
8 74 Am Jur 2d p 545 , as to tender by check 
unless the offeree objects to payment by < he< k 
see Sec 70A-2-511, U C.A 1953 
9 Paggi v Skhns, 54 Utah 88, 179 P 739 
(1919) 
MAXFIELD v FISHLER 
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thus $1,100 short of the amount past due, 
and when the next annual installment of 
something over $8,000, came due on hebru-
ary 1, 1974, it failed to make that payment 
This brought the defendants' notice of for-
feiture, to which the plaintiff made no re-
sponsive performance, but instead attempt-
ed to justify non performance on the 
grounds discussed herein. 
Upon consideration of the total circum-
stances as shown by the depositions and 
documentary evidence, we are not persuad-
ed that the trial court was in error in con-
cluding that plaintiff has raised no issue of 
material fact which if resolved in its favor 
would entitle it to prevail Therefore the 
summary judgment will not be disturbed 
Affirmed 
spondents) 
Costs to defendants (re-
HENRIOD, C J , and ELLETT, 
TUCKETT and MAUGHAN, J], concur 
Susan E. MAXFIELD, as guardian ad litem 
for Laurie Ann Maxfleld, Plain-
tiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Kenneth O. FISHLER, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 13955. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Aug 1, 1975 
ing, District Judge, pro tern held that dis-
missal for failure to prosecute did not con 
stitute an abuse of discretion since plain-
tiff was not ready to proceed on trial date, 
which was more than two years after com-
plaint was filed, such failure was the result 
of inexcusable neglect, and no justification 
for a continuance was shown. 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J , dissented and filed opinion 
in which Maughan, J , joined 
Crockett, J , disqualified himself. 
1. Dismissal and Nonsuit €=>60(l) 
Litigants must prosecute their claims 
with due diligence, or accept the penalty of 
dismissal. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
41(b) 
2. Dismissal and Nonsuit @=>60(6) 
Where medical malpractice action was 
filed on October 18, 1972, trial date was 
set for October 24, 1974, where on trial 
date plaintiff's counsel moved for continu-
ance after stating that person he had 
hoped would testify was absent, and where 
record showed that plaintiff or her counsel 
had been dilatory in responding to efforts 
of defendant to obtain discovery and had 
resisted defendant's attempts to resolve the 
issue by getting the case to trial, dismissal 
for failure to prosecute was not an abuse 
of discretion since plaintiff was not ready 
to proceed on trial date, such failure was 
the result of inexcusable neglect, and no 
justification for continuance was shown. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 40(b), 
41(b). 
Action was brought seeking to recover 
damages for medical malpractice The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Bryant H Croft, J , dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to prosecute, and plain-
hff appealed. The Supreme Court, Hard-
Boyd M. Fullmer of Fullmer & Harding, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
John H. Snow, Worsley, Snow & Chns-
tensen, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
respondent. 
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HARDING, District Judge Pro Tern.: 
Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's 
order dismissing her complaint with preju-
dice for failure to prosecute pursuant to 
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The basic question is whether or not the 
trial court abused its discretion in dismiss-
ing the action. 
The complaint, for medical malpractice, 
was filed October 18, 1972, and process 
was served on October 23, 1972. The de-
fendant answered on November 13, 1972. 
The plaintiff was a nonresident of Utah, 
and defendant filed a notice requiring se-
curity for costs. The plaintiff failed to 
file a bond within one month as required 
by Rule 12(j), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and on December 26, 1972, the de-
fendant moved for a dismissal. The plain-
tiff was ordered to file the bond by Janu-
ary 3, 1973. No bond whatever was filed 
until January 10, 1975, at the time the no-
tice of appeal was filed. 
On January 25, 1973, the defendant took 
the plaintiff's deposition. Neither party 
took any further action in the case until 
March 14, 1974, when defendant submitted 
interrogatories and asked that the case be 
set for trial. Plaintiff objected to the in-
terrogatories and to the setting of the case 
for trial on the grounds of insufficiency of 
time to answer the interrogatories and that 
discpvery had not been completed. The 
objections were not noticed for hearing, 
but a trial date was set for October 29, 
1974, with a jury. Additional interrogato-
ries were submitted by defendant on May 
20, 1974, which went unanswered, and on 
October 18, 1974, the defendant moved for 
an order to require answers or for dismis-
sal of the claim. The answers were filed 
October 24, 1974, five days before the trial 
date. 
On the trial date, plaintiff, her husband, 
and her counsel, and the defendant and his 
counsel were present. Plaintiff's counsel 
requested a conference with the court in 
chambers before selecting the jurors to try 
the case. At the conference plaintiff's 
counsel acknowledged that he had no medi-
cal expert to testify. He stated that the 
person he had hoped to have testify was 
absent from the jurisdiction when he had 
attempted to subpoena him four days ear-
lier and would not return by the trial date. 
No medical experts had been deposed or 
even contacted for the purpose of testify-
ing by plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff's coun-
sel moved for a continuance. The court 
asked plaintiff's counsel to make an offer 
of proof of the testimony he expected of 
the medical expert. Plaintiff's counsel 
stated that one of the doctors who had 
cared for the child for whom damages 
were being sought had said that the de-
fendant had done nothing wrong in caring 
for the child, but claimed that the same 
doctor had made contrary statements to the 
plaintiff. That was the extent of the offer 
of proof as far as plaintiff's claim was 
concerned. 
The court determined that a sufficient 
showing of diligence or of justification for 
a continuance had not been made and de-
nied the motion. 
Plaintiff's counsel now states that he 
could have proceeded with the trial using 
only the parents of the child and the de-
fendant doctor as an adverse witness on 
the question of the proper standard of care 
of a medical doctor. The record does not 
show that a request to so proceed was ever 
made. 
[1,2] No showing was made that plain-
tiff's counsel had made or attempted to 
make any discovery of evidence to support 
the action. The record showed that plain-
tiff or her counsel had been dilatory in re-
sponding to defendant's efforts at discov-
ery, and had resisted his attempts to re-
solve the issues by getting the case to trial. 
It is evident that plaintiff was not ready 
to proceed at the time the trial date ar-
rived; that such failure was the result of 
PRINCE v. PETERSON 
Cite a« 638 I\2d 1325 
inexcusable neglect in failing to prepare 
and prosecute her claim with reasonable 
diligence; and that no justification for 
continuance was shown as required by 
Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, is to be effective in expediting and 
resolving litigation, it must require liti-
gants to prosecute their claims with due 
diligence, or accept the penalty of dismis-
sal. 
Utah 1325 
Dennis PRINCE, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Darlene PETERSON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 13765. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 22, 1975. 
The ruling of the trial court is affirmed. 
Costs to respondent. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and TUCKETT, J., 
concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting): 
This case was dismissed for failure to 
prosecute on the very day it was to be 
tried. The plaintiff moved for a continu-
ance in order for her to obtain an expert 
witness, and the defendant thereupon 
moved for the dismissal of the action. 
In the light of the history of this case, I 
think the court might have been justified 
in refusing to continue the matter, but I do 
not see how the court could dismiss it for 
failure to prosecute at trial unless the 
plaintiff refused to produce evidence. 
While it may have appeared to the trial 
judge that the plaintiff was certain to lose 
the case in the absence of an expert wit-
ness, I think he could not for that reason 
dismiss the case. He should have ordered 
the plaintiff to proceed to trial. A dismis-
sal might have been proper at the conclu-
sion of her evidence, but not before it was 
offered. 
I would reverse the judgment of dismis-
sal and award costs to the appellant. 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views 
expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice EHett. 
CROCKETT, J., having disqualified 
himself, does not participate herein. 
Defendant appealed a judgment of the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, J. 
Robert Bullock, J., awarding plaintiff com-
pensatory and punitive damages in libel 
and slander suit. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that written and oral 
statements that defendant was a "clever 
crook" and was "stealing from his own 
children," made in regard to plaintiff's op-
eration of business and his efforts to sell 
it, were slanderous; that award of $5,537 
as compensatory damages to plaintiff who 
spent approximately 25 days attempting to 
overcome harm caused by slanderous re-
marks would not be disturbed; and that 
award of $3,000 punitive damages was ex-
cessive and would be reduced to $1,000. 
Affirmed as modified. 
Hennod, C. J., fded a dissenting opin-
ion in which Maughan, J., concurred. 
1. Libel and Slander ®=»6(I) 
The making of some general statement 
about another being a crook or even using 
profanity against him in a general way 
may not be actionable slander; however, if 
words of such character are used in a con-
text or under circumstances as they would 
reasonably be understood to come within 
traditional requirements of libel or slander: 
that is, to hold a person up to hatred, con-
tempt or| ridicule, or to injure him in his 
business or vocation, they are deemed ac-
tionable per se; and law presumes that 
damages will be suffered therefrom. 
2. Libel and Slander <S=>6(2, 4) 
Written and oral statements that plain-
tiff was a drunk and a "clever crook" and 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI DENIED 
Title Docket Lower Court 
Number Date Citation or Number 
Smith v. Rocky Mt. Helicopter 890129 5/30/89 870511-CA 
F.rst Fed. v A,r Terminal
 8 9 0166 6 /7 /89 771 P.2d 1096 
Sampson v. R.ch.ns
 8 9 0 1 4 6 6/7/8g 7 7 0 P 2 d 9 9 8 
HARDY v. 
Cite u 776 fad 917 
Colin Edward HARDY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Nellie Peterson HARDY, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870348-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 20, 1989. 
Former husband filed motion for modi-
fication of divorce decree, requesting custo-
dy of child. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, John A. Rokich, J., modified 
divorce decree by transferring custody of 
child from former wife to former husband, 
and former wife appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) trial court 
properly received evidence pertaining not 
only to former wife's changed circumstanc-
es but also as to child's best interests in 
nonbifurcated hearing; (2) remand of case 
was necessary for entry of appropriate 
findings which clearly articulated judge's 
considerations behind his finding that 
change of custody was in child's best inter-
ests; (3) trial judge did not abuse his dis-
cretion in refusing to continue trial to allow 
former wife's new attorneys to prepare for 
trial; and (4) substantial evidence in record 
as to former wife's precarious financial cir-
cumstances, as compared with former hus-
band's relatively prosperous situation, jus-
tified trial court's refusal to award costs to 
former husband. 
Affirmed in part and remanded. 
1. Divorce «=»303<2) 
If initial custody decree is unlitigated, 
such as where custody is obtained by de-
fault divorce or parties stipulate as to cus-
tody, then trial court, on motion to modify 
custody decree, may focus custody determi-
nation on child's best interests, as opposed 
to custodial parent's changed circumstanc-
es. 
2. Divorce «=»303(2, 5) 
Trial court properly received evidence 
pertaining not only to custodial parent's 
HARDY Utah 91^ 
(UtahApp. 1989) 
changed circumstances, but also as V 
child's best interests, in nonbifurcata 
hearing on noncustodial parent's motion U 
modify divorce decree by changing custodi 
al parent for child, even though initial fc 
cus in modification proceedings is normal 1; 
on custodial parent's changed circumstanc 
es, and child's best interests are considered 
only after changed circumstances an 
found; initial custody determination wa 
stipulated to by parties, and thus custod; 
was not based on impartial judicial exami 
nation of child's best interests, and evi 
dence establishing parents' substance ad 
dictions was also probative for both deter 
mining child's best interests and parties 
respective parenting abilities. 
3. Appeal and Error «=>1008.1(5) 
Trial «=395<5) 
Trial court's findings of fact must in 
elude enough facts to disclose procesi 
through which ultimate conclusion ii 
reached; indicate that process is logica 
and properly supported; and not be clearl] 
erroneous. 
4. Parent and Child *=»2(18) 
Trial court should state those factors i 
considered in making its determination oi 
motion to change custodial parent, such ai 
needs of child, ability of each parent U 
meet those needs, parenting ability of cus 
todial parent, and functioning of estab 
lished custodial relationship. 
5. Trial <*=»393(3) 
Oral findings of fact and conclusion! 
of law made by court when it rules fron 
bench are sufficient. Rules Civ.Proc., Rul< 
52(a). 
6. Parent and Child «=»2(18) 
Weight that trial court accords to sta 
bility and continuity of existing custodia 
relationship when determining whether U 
change custodial parent will depend upor 
duration of existing custody arrangement 
child's age, nature of developing relation 
ship between child and both parents, anc 
how well child is thriving physically, men 
tally and emotionally. 
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7. Divorce «=*312.7 
Remand of trial court's determination 
to modify divorce decree by transferring 
custody of child from former wife to for-
mer husband was necessary for entry of 
appropriate findings which clearly articu-
lated judge's considerations behind his find-
ing that change in custody was in child's 
best interests; judge orally found that 
change of custody was in child's best inter-
ests, but failed to make any specific factual 
findings supporting that conclusion. 
8. Divorce «=»312.2, 312.5 
Court of Appeals would not consider 
former wife's allegation that trial court 
erred in failing to provide written instruc-
tions to expert witnesses in custody hear-
ing pursuant to Rules of Evidence, where 
record indicated that alleged lack of writ-
ten instructions was not objected to nor 
even mentioned at time of trial, and there 
was no indication in record as to what 
instructions, if any, were given to expert 
witnesses. Rules of Evid., Rule 706(a). 
9. Appeal and Error «=970(2) 
Court of Appeals will not reverse trial 
court's determination on admissibility of 
proffered evidence absent abuse of discre-
tion affecting party's substantial rights. 
Rules of Evid., Rule 103. 
10. Pretrial Procedure «=»45 
Trial court does not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to admit evidence which is 
not timely provided to opposing party, con-
trary to court's instructions. 
11. Divorce «=>85 
Letter from former wife's therapist 
was inadmissible in child custody modifica-
tion hearing, where former wife had not 
timely provided it to former husband. 
12. Evidence e»535 
Home study performed by former 
wife's counselor at out-patient drug treat-
ment center was inadmissible in child cus-
tody modification hearing, as counselor had 
not qualified as expert. 
13. Appeal and Error «=>931(6) 
Where trial is to court rather than to 
jury, court's rulings on evidence need not 
be subjected to as critical an inquiry be-
cause, in arriving at his conclusions, judge 
will include in his consideration his knowl-
edge and judgment as to materiality, com-
petency and effect of evidence; in such 
cases, there is presumption that trial judge 
has disregarded all inadmissible evidence in 
reaching his decision. 
14. Divorce «=>303(8) 
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in child custody modification hearing by 
reading depositions and reports that judge 
did not admit into evidence; trial judge 
specifically disavowed placing much re-
liance on them in his decision making pro-
cess. 
15. Divorce <S=312.6(9) 
Whether trial judge erred in refusing 
to admit certain depositions into evidence in 
child custody modification proceeding was 
immaterial, where disputed evidence, re-
garding former wife's cocaine addiction 
and relationship with drug dealer, was 
merely cumulative to other evidence, in-
cluding former wife's own testimony. 
16. Appeal and Error «=>966(1) 
Pretrial Procedure «=>713 
Granting of continuance rests in sound 
discretion of trial court, and denial of con-
tinuance will not be reversed *on appeal 
unless court has abused that discretion by 
acting unreasonably. 
17. Divorce «=*145 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by denying continuance to former wife in 
child custody modification proceeding, even 
though former wife had new attorney, 
where judge had already continued trial at 
former wife's request on one other occa-
sion so that new counsel could prepare 
case, prosecution of case had been substan-
tially delayed by former wife's dilatory con-
duct, and trial judge had previously made it 
clear that time was of essence in that 
child's best interests required timely reso-
lution of dispute. 
18. Divorce «=»188 
In modification of divorce decrees pur-
suant to continuing jurisdiction of trial 
court, question of ability or inability of 
HARDY v. HARDY 
Cite M 77* P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989) 
Utah 919 
party to pay costs in defending matter is 
factual matter which lies in discretion of 
trial court. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
19. Divorce «=»312V4 
Substantial evidence set forth in record 
as to former wife's precarious financial cir-
cumstances, as compared to former hus-
band's relatively prosperous situation, jus-
tified trial court's refusal to award costs to 
former husband after divorce decree was 
modified by transferring custody of child 
from former wife to former husband. 
John B. Anderson, William A. Somppi, 
Allan M. Metos, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant and appellant. 
John F. Clark, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and respondent. 
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and 
ORME, JJ. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant/appellant, Nellie Peterson 
Hardy, appeals the trial court's order which 
modified the divorce decree transferring 
custody of the parties' minor child, S., from 
her to plaintiff/respondent, Colin Edward 
Hardy. We affirm in part and remand for 
findings consistent with this opinion. 
The parties were married in 1982 and had 
one child, S. During this marriage, both 
p rties engaged in drug and alcohol abuse. 
They were divorced on April 8, 1985, stipu-
lating that appellant was a fit and proper 
person to have custody of S. The trial 
court was unaware at that time that appel-
lant was addicted to cocaine and that re-
spondent was an alcoholic. 
In November 1985, respondent success-
fully completed a hospital alcoholism treat-
ment program, and was alcohol-free at the 
time of this action. However, he used mar-
ijuana twice in April 1986. 
In the summer of 1985, appellant sub-
stantially increased her cocaine usage and 
became romantically involved with Rudy 
Lema, a drug dealer. In February 1986, 
appellant quit her job because of cocaine 
usage. During this time, appellant neglect-
ed S. In the beginning of 1985, S. had 
been a bright, outgoing, happy three-year-
old who made friends easily. By the end of 
1985 and during the first three months of 
1986, however, she had become withdrawn, 
standoffish, depressed, and exhibited other 
disturbed behavior as a result of appel-
lant's neglect. 
On April 18, 1986, at 1:00 p.m., a high-
way patrolman stopped appellant for speed-
ing and driving erratically on the freeway 
in Utah County. He found S. in the ve-
hicle, unrestrained by a seatbelt. Because 
appellant was in a confused, excited, inco-
herent state and appeared to be under the 
influence of drugs, the patrolman trans-
ported the two to the Timpview Mental 
Health Unit in Provo and involuntarily 
committed appellant. Appellant and S. 
were then transported to the University 
Hospital in Salt Lake City. Appellant's 
attending physician believed that she was 
suffering from chronic cocaine abuse syn-
drome in which delusional disorders and 
severe impairment might be present for 
weeks or months, and that appellant was in 
no condition to care for S. 
University Hospital personnel informed 
respondent that appellant had been admit-
ted to the hospital and that if he was not 
able to pick up S., the hospital would have 
to place her in a shelter home. Respondent 
agreed to take S. and to return her to 
appellant's custody upon her discharge. 
Instead of returning S. to appellant's custo-
dy, however, he took S. home with him that 
night and subsequently moved her to his 
parents' home in Saratoga, California. 
On April 24, 1986, appellant discharged 
herself from the hospital against medical 
advice, and returned to her parents' home 
in Scottsdale, Arizona. She subsequently 
admitted herself to Terros, an outpatient 
drug treatment center in Phoenix, Arizona, 
where she completed a twenty-one day de-
toxification program. 
On May 8, 1986, respondent filed a mo-
tion for modification of the 1985 custody 
order, requesting custody of S. On May 
19, 1986, the trial court heard respondent's 
motion, and, in a preliminary injunction, 
ordered both parties to undergo home stud-
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ies and psychological evaluations. It also 
awarded temporary custody of S. to appel-
lant so long as she resided with her parents 
in Scottsdale, Arizona, and forbade either 
party to abuse drugs in S.'s presence. 
On September 5, 1986, appellant's coun-
sel withdrew. Appellant subsequently ob-
tained representation from the Arizona-
based Legal Aid Society. 
In September 1986, the court appointed a 
social worker, Frances R. Purdie, to con-
duct home studies and a licensed psycholo-
gist, Dr. Barbara Liebroder, to conduct 
psychological evaluations of the parties. 
The case was set for trial on March 2 and 
3, 1987, but, upon appellant's motion, was 
continued until May 7 and 8, 1987 so that 
appellant's new counsel from the Legal Aid 
Society, David Hartwig, could prepare for 
trial. 
On February 27, 1987, respondent was 
granted extended visitation with S. for for-
ty-five days from March 4, 1987 to April 14, 
1987. Liebroder evaluated S. a second time 
immediately following her return from this 
visitation. 
On March 28, 1987, appellant married 
Robert Bruce Blake in Arizona. Respon-
dent, Purdie, and Liebroder were unaware 
of her remarriage until the day before trial. 
Consequently, no home or psychological 
studies were done involving Blake. 
Appellant's attorney, Hartwig, left the 
Legal Aid Society shortly before trial. Ap-
pellant's case was then assigned to other 
Legal Aid Society attorneys. Despite his 
pending departure, Hartwig made no for-
mal motion to continue the May trial date, 
but, one week before trial, contacted the 
judge by telephone to ask for a continu-
ance, which the judge denied. 
The matter came to trial on May 7, 8 and 
12, 1987 before the same judge who had 
made the initial custody award. Hartwig, 
despite his departure from Legal Aid, was 
present for part of the trial and conducted 
much of the examination and cross-exami-
nation on the second day of the trial. 
Purdie, on the basis of her home evalua-
tions performed on the parties and their 
parents, testified that S. was emotionally 
deprived, and that, even though appellant 
and her parents obviously cared for S., 
their concern and caring were not ex-
pressed in such a way that would help S. to 
realize her full potential. She testified, 
instead, that S. was being emotionally dam-
aged in her present environment and that 
she would have more of her emotional 
needs met in respondent's custody. 
Liebroder, who had performed psycho-
logical evaluations on each of the parties, 
two on S., and a screening evaluation on 
respondent's new wife, testified that appel-
lant's drug use, because it was being treat-
ed and was currently under control, was 
not appellant's most serious problem, al-
though she had a poor prognosis for contin-
ued abstinence. Liebroder concluded that 
appellant's most serious problems were 
that she was extremely self-centered and 
had difficulty empathizing with, under-
standing, and caring in a significant way 
for other people, and that these were symp-
toms of a chronic, change-resistant charac-
ter disorder. She noted no really signifi-
cant interaction between appellant and S., 
who had an unusually negative self-image. 
Liebroder indicated that S. appeared to 
be suffering from a lack of attention and 
nurturing. She stated that S.'s needs for a 
structured environment, adequate stimu-
lation, and interaction with other children 
were not being met, and that she had suf-
fered serious emotional damage while in 
appellant's custody. She concluded that S. 
was in serious jeopardy of sustaining per-
manent emotional damage along with loss 
of use of her intellectual potential and per-
sonality, and had already adopted, at age 
four, a very non-achieving lifestyle. 
Liebroder testified that respondent, on 
the other hand, had a great deal of energy 
and determination to succeed and was a 
disciplined person. She found that his rela-
tionship difficulties were related to his alco-
holism, which was currently under control, 
and that he had the ability, stability, and 
structured lifestyle to be a good parent for 
S. Regarding S.'s April visitation with re-
spondent, Liebroder indicated that S. had 
changed behaviorally for the better, that 
her intelligence scores had jumped twenty 
HARDY v. 
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points, and that these changes were not 
attributable to chance, but were reflective 
of the time S. had spent in respondent's 
custody. 
Dr. Lindeman, a psychologist hired by 
appellant, testified that appellant's person-
ality was within normal limits and that, 
contrary to Liebroder's study, appellant did 
not have any serious psychological or emo-
tional problems. He indicated that he was 
pleasantly surprised with S.'s relationship 
with appellant, and that appellant not only 
did not have the personality disorder diag-
nosed by Liebroder, but that Liebroder's 
study did not justify such a diagnosis.1 He 
also noted, however, that appellant was in 
the middle to high risk range for further 
drug abuse. 
Liebroder rebutted Lindeman's testimo-
ny, stating that he used a very cursory 
battery of tests to arrive at his conclusions 
as opposed to her large variety of in-depth 
tests, and because Lindeman's observation 
of S. took place two weeks after she re-
turned from visitation with respondent, the 
behavior he observed was attributable to 
the visitation. 
In summary, Liebroder believed that re-
spondent was more likely than appellant to 
remain alcohol and drug free over time. 
Because she found that S.'s social and psy-
chological needs were not being met, and 
that, at age four, she was already moving 
into a non-achieving, manipulative life pat-
tern as a result of the current custodial 
situation with appellant, Liebroder recom-
mended that respondent take custody of S. 
During the trial, respondent's counsel re-
quested publication of Rudy Lema's deposi-
tion rather than bringing him in as a wit-
ness, because, at that time, he was a feder-
al prisoner in transit to a federal peniten-
tiary. However, the judge refused to pub-
lish the deposition, which he had read prior 
to trial, because respondent's counsel had 
made no attempt to serve process on Lema. 
The court excluded some proffered evi-
dence during the trial. Most of this evi-
I. Other evidence was admitted supporting 
Lindeman's conclusion: Although he did not 
testify at trial, Atila Dereli, a licensed psycholo-
gist associated with appellant's outpatient drug 
HARDY Utah 
(UlahApp. 1989) 
dence was proffered by respond< 
show, in greater detail, the nature a 
tent of appellant's cocaine addiction 
pellant's only disallowed evidence ' 
letter written by her therapist and a 
study performed by her counselor, 
judge disallowed the letter because 
lant had not timely provided it to r< 
dent, and the home study because he 
that the counselor was not qualified 
expert 
At the conclusion of the trial, cu 
was transferred to respondent On 
19, 1987, appellant moved for a new 
and a stay of the custody order pei 
appeal. On June 29, Hartwig filed an 
davit indicating, among other things, 
he had requested a continuance to i 
new counsel adequate preparation time 
that appellant had not been allowed s 
cient time to present her case during i 
The trial court denied this motion, ord 
that the parties split the cost of the ps\ 
logical evaluations and home studies, 
nied respondent's motion for legal cost 
$803.70, and approved the transfer of p 
ical custody of S. from appellant to res] 
dent, which was to take place on July 
1987. 
The following issues raised by appell 
are of primary concern: (1) whether 
trial court erred in admitting evidence 
garding both the substantial change in 
pellant's circumstances and S.'s best inl 
eats, including changes in respondent's 
cumstances, thus failing to bifurcate i 
hearing; and (2) whether the court erred 
awarding custody to respondent, abs< 
specific factual findings. 
Appellant raised numerous additional 
sues, including the following: (1) wheth 
the trial court must provide written instn 
tions to expert witnesses; and (2) wheth 
the court abused its discretion by: (a) i 
stricting appellant's proffered testimon 
(b) reading depositions and reports whi< 
were not admitted into evidence; (c) r 
fusing to grant a continuance to allow nev 
treatment program, prepared a written repot 
and stated that appellant was a caring persoi 
and was willing to take care of other people an 
help them. 
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ly appointed attorneys to prepare for trial; 
(d) awarding custody to respondent, who 
admitted that he had intentionally violated 
prior court orders by hiding S. from appel-
lant; and (e) refusing to allow new home 
studies. 
Respondent asserts that the trial court 
erred in refusing to award him court costs. 
At the outset, we note that under the 
well-established standard of review for 
child custody proceedings, we do not set 
aside the trial court's factual findings un-
less clearly erroneous, but give due regard 
to the opportunity of the trial judge to 
ascertain the witnesses' credibility. Mar-
chant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 202 
(Utah Ct.App.1987). A finding is clearly 
erroneous if it is against the great weight 
of the evidence or if we are otherwise 
definitely and firmly convinced that a mis-
take has been made. Johnson v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 696, 697 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Pow-
er Systems and Controls, Inc. v. Keiths 
Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (UUh 
Ct.App.1988). 
BIFURCATION OF PROCEEDINGS 
11,21 In an unbifurcated hearing, the 
judge considered evidence concerning both 
parents' changed circumstances, S.'s rela-
tionship with both parents, and additional 
evidence relevant to S.'s best interests. He 
found that there was a material change in 
appellant's circumstances because of the 
serious nature of her addiction, and that 
neither party had previously apprised him 
that appellant was a cocaine addict and 
respondent an alcoholic at the time of the 
divorce. He then orally found that a 
change of custody was in S.'s best interest. 
Appellant asserts that in following this pro-
cedure, the trial court erroneously failed to 
bifurcate the hearing pursuant to Hogge v. 
Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53-54 (Utah 1982) and 
Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 
1984), thus improperly mingling evidence of 
appellant's changed circumstances and S.'s 
best interests, including respondent's 
changed circumstances, in the same hear-
ing. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth in 
Hogge and later clarified in Becker a two-
step procedure for modifying a custody 
order: (1) the party seeking custody must 
show that there has been a material change 
in the custodial parent's circumstances 
upon which the original custody award was 
based, and (2) once a change in circum-
stances has been shown, the transfer of 
custody must be in the child's best inter-
ests. Hogge, 649 P.2d at 53-54; Becker, 
694 P.2d at 610. Usually, 
the noncustodial parent's change of cir-
cumstances is relevant only to a determi-
nation of whether, under the second 
prong of the Hogge-Becker test, the best 
interests of the child warrant a shift in 
custody, an issue reached only after a 
change of custodial circumstances has 
been found and the issue of custody has 
been reopened. 
Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 627 
(Utah 1987). 
In a recent decision, this court reasoned 
that if an initial custody award is based 
upon a thorough examination by the trial 
court of the various factors relevant to the 
child's "welfare, a rigid application of the 
Hogge-Becker change in circumstances 
test is appropriate. Maughan v. Mau-
ghan, 770 P.2d 166, 160 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). In such a case, the court has al-
ready considered the child's best interests 
and fashioned the custody award accord-
ingly. Id. Any subsequent petition for 
modification of custody must overcome the 
high threshold set forth in Hogge "to 'pro-
tect the child from "ping-pong" custody 
awards' and the accompanying instability 
so damaging to a child's proper develop-
ment." Id. (quoting Kramer, 738 P.2d at 
626.) If, however, the initial custody de-
cree is unlitigated, e.g., where custody is 
obtained by default divorce or where the 
parties stipulate as to custody, then the 
trial court may focus the custody determi-
nation on the child's best interests. Mau-
ghan, 770 P.2d at 160. Subsequent to 
Maughan, the Utah Supreme Court fol-
lowed this same line of reasoning in Elmer 
v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), holding 
that "in change of custody cases involving 
a nonlitigated custody decree, a trial court, 
in applying the changed circumstances test, 
should receive evidence on changed circum-
stances and that evidence may include evi-
dence that pertains to the best interests of 
the child." Id. at 605. In such cases, the 
res judicata purpose served by the 
Hogge-Becker test must be subservient to 
the child's best interests. Id. at 603. 
The stability with which the law is pri-
marily concerned is not the stability of 
the legal custody arrangement as such, 
but rather the stability that makes possi-
ble the psychological and emotional se-
curity that underlies a child's well-devel-
oped sense of self-worth and self-confi-
dence— [This stability is a means of] 
promoting the ultimate objective, the 
overall best interests of the child. 
Id. at 604 (citations omitted). In such 
cases, "[t]oo rigid an application of the 
[Hogge-Becker test] would lock a child into 
the custody of one parent or the other 
where there has been no determination on 
the merits of parenting ability of either 
parent and custody has been awarded only 
because of the default of one parent in 
failing to oppose the complaint of the oth-
er." Id. Quoting Kramer, 738 P.2d at 629 
(Howe, J., concurring)). Elmer concludes, 
"In sum, we hold that in change of custody 
cases involving a nonlitigated custody de-
cree, a trial court, in applying the changed-
circumstances test, should receive evidence 
on changed circumstances and that evi-
dence may include evidence that pertains to 
the best interests of the child." Id. at 
605. 
The initial custody determination in this 
matter was unlitigated, as was also the 
case in Maughan and Elmer, because it 
was stipulated to by the parties. Conse-
quently, custody was not based upon an 
2. Taking a broader range of evidence than nor-
mally allowed under the changed-circumstances 
test is appropriate in this case for an additional 
reason and resolves a nagging dilemma for the 
trial court. Because the evidence establishing 
appellant's and respondent's respective addic-
tions was also probative for determining S.'s 
best interests and the parties' respective parent-
ing abilities, there was no effective way to bifur-
cate the hearing and strictly limit the evidence 
to that relating only to appellant's changed cir-
cumstances. Evidence regarding appellant's 
changed circumstances dealt primarily with her 
HARDY v. HARDY 
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impartial judicial examination of S 
interests. In fact, evidence in the 
indicates that the initial custody av 
appellant was inimical to S.'s best inl 
and its continuation could seriousl 
ardize S.'s psychological, intellectu 
emotional development. Thus, a ri, 
plication of the Hogge-Becker chanj 
cumstances test, as urged by appel 
inappropriate here.* Therefore, w 
that the trial court did not commit e 
receiving evidence pertaining not ( 
appellant's changed circumstances b 
to S.'s best interests in a non-bifi 
hearing. 
FACTUAL FINDINGS 
Appellant next argues that we 
overturn the trial court's order beci 
made no specific finding that resp 
was a fit and proper person to take c 
of S. 
13-6] This court requires that fii 
of fact (1) include enough facts to di 
the process through which the ul 
conclusion is reached, (2) indicate th 
process is logical and properly supj 
and (3) be not clearly erroneous. 
chant, 743 P.2d at 202-03. "A men 
ing that the parties are or are not ' t 
proper persons to be awarded the 
custody, and control' of the child ( 
pass muster when the custody awi 
challenged and an abuse of the trial c 
discretion is urged on appeal." Ma 
v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 
(per curiam). The trial court should 
those factors it considered in makii 
determination, such as the needs c 
child, the ability of each parent to 
cocaine addiction and how its use im 
negatively upon her care of and relati 
with S. and it is relevant to both chang 
cumstances and S.'s best interests. The 
witnesses presented evidence relevant t< 
appellant's changed circumstances and S 
interests which was so intertwined that b 
tion of the two issues would have done vi 
to an orderly, reasonable presentation, 
have created confusion and misundersta 
and would have resulted in further expen 
inconvenience to the witnesses and the r. 
924 U t a h 7 7 6 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
those needs, the parenting ability of the 
custodial parent, and the functioning of the 
established custodial relationship. Myers 
v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989). "Failure of the trial court to make 
findings on all material issues is reversible 
error unless the facts in the record are 
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of sup-
porting only a finding in favor of the judg-
ment' " Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. 
Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)).3 
[6] Although we find that the trial 
court did not err in failing to bifurcate the 
hearing, the supreme court has indicated 
that the trial court's "findings of fact 
should reflect that the court considered 
stability as a factor in the custody decision 
and the weight the court accorded it." El-
mer, 776 P.2d at 605; see also Paryzek v. 
Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81-84 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). The weight the trial court accords 
to the stability and continuity of the exist-
ing custodial relationship will depend upon 
the duration of the existing custody ar-
rangement, the child's age, the nature of 
the developing relationship between the 
child and both parents, and how well the 
child is thriving physically, mentally and 
emotionally. Elmer, 776 P.2d at 604. 
[7] The trial judge orally found that a 
change of custody was in S.'s best interests 
but failed to make any specific factual find-
ings supporting this conclusion. There-
fore, even though the ultimate disposition 
seems abundantly reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, we are compelled to remand 
the case for entry of appropriate findings 
which clearly articulate the judge's consid-
erations behind his finding that the change 
of custody is in S.'s best interests. 
To reduce confusion and to lessen the 
possibility of an additional appeal, we ad-
dress appellant's remaining issues. 
WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO 
EXPERT WITNESSES 
[8] Appellant claims that the trial court 
erred in failing to provide written instruc-
tions to expert witnesses pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Evidence 706(a), which requires 
the expert witness to "be informed of his 
duties by the court in writing, a copy of 
which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a 
conference in which the parties shall have 
opportunity to participate." Our review of 
the record indicates that this alleged lack 
of written instructions was not objected to 
nor even mentioned at the time of trial. 
Further, there is no indication in the record 
as to what instructions, if any, were given 
to the expert witnesses. It is well estab-
lished that we will not consider any issue 
raised for the first time on appeal. Mar-
chant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 
(Utah Ct.App.1989) appeal filed 106 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 63 (1989). "A matter is suffi-
ciently raised if it is submitted to the trial 
court, and the court is afforded an opportu-
nity to rule on the issue." State v. One 
1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 684 
(Utah CtApp. 1989). The trial court was 
not given such an opportunity here, so we 
decline to address appellant's point. 
RESTRICTION OF PROFFERED 
TESTIMONY 
[9-12] Appellant asserts that the trial 
court abused its discretion in restricting 
some of her proffered testimony. Our re-
view of the record reveals that the trial 
court disallowed the following proffered 
testimony: a letter from appellant's thera-
pist on the basis that appellant had not 
timely provided it to respondent, and a 
home study performed by appellant's coun-
selor at Terros on the basis that the coun-
selor was not qualified as an expert. We 
will not reverse a trial court's determina-
tion on the admissibility of proffered evi-
dence absent an abuse of discretion affect-
ing a party's substantial rights. Utah 
R.Evid. 103; see also State v. Jamison, 767 
P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct.App.1989); State v. 
3. Oral findings of fact and conclusions of law 
made by the court when it rules from the bench 
arc sufficient. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
Aase, 762 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). The trial court does not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to admit evidence 
which is not timely provided to the oppos-
ing party contrary to the court's instruc-
tions. Further, "[t]he matter of qualifica-
tion of an expert witness lies in the discre-
tion of the court." State v. Locke, 688 
P.2d 464, 464 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) 
(footnote omitted); see also State v. El-
dredge, 773 P.2d 29, 33-34 (1989); State v. 
Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 14 (Utah CtApp.1988). 
Under the facts set forth in the record, we 
do not find any abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court. 
DEPOSITIONS NOT ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE 
[13,14] Appellant claims that the trial 
court abused its discretion by reading depo-
sitions and reports that it did not admit into 
evidence, Rudy Lema's deposition in partic-
ular,4 suggesting that the trial court may 
have improperly based its decision upon 
them. 
At the outset, we note that the trial 
judge, upon being questioned by appel-
lant's counsel regarding this evidence, spe-
cifically disavowed relying on it much in his 
decision making process. He stated, "I 
read the deposition in its entirety, and I 
don't believe that's going to be a major 
factor in my decision. So, I will not allow 
it in, but even if it were allowed in I'm not 
giving it that much weight" 
It is obvious that for the court to rule on 
the admissibility of the evidence in ques-
tion, the court must be familiar with it, 
and, so, must read it. The law is well 
established that where the trial is to the 
court rather than to a jury, the court's 
rulings on evidence need not be subjected 
to as critical an inquiry because, in arriving 
at his conclusions, the judge will include in 
4. In his deposition, Lema testified that after the 
May 19, 1986 hearing, he visited appellant in 
Phoenix on four occasions. Each time, he 
brought large amounts of cocaine, which he and 
appellant used together. On one trip in late 
June, he and appellant spent three days and two 
nights in a hotel drinking alcohol and using 
cocaine. He also arranged through appellant to 
sell two ounces of cocaine to her brother. 
HARDY v. HARDY 
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his consideration his knowledge an 
ment as to the materiality, compete] 
effect of the evidence. In re Es 
Baxter, 16 Utah 2d 284, 399 P.2d 4 
(1965); see also Del Porto v. Nic 
Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811, 814 (197: 
per Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 1 
2d 122, 417 P.2d 132, 136 (1966). I 
cases, there is a presumption that tl 
judge has disregarded all inadmissil 
dence in reaching his decision. Co 
v. Connolly, 209 Mont 298, 680 P.S 
573 (1984). Appellant has not ovc 
this presumption, so we find that th 
court did not abuse its discretion h< 
[15] Further, inquiry is not 1 
merely to whether or not an erroi 
have been committed, but whether tli 
any "reasonable likelihood that the 
affected the outcome of the proceed 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 
1989). Our review of the record an 
proffered evidence indicates that th 
puted evidence was merely cumulath 
cause the critical facts surrounding i 
lant's cocaine addiction and relatio 
with Lema, which were brought out i 
disputed evidence, were also brought ( 
other evidence, including appellant's 
testimony. Therefore, whether or no 
judge erred in refusing to admit the de 
tions is immaterial. 
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL 
Appellant alleges that the trial ji 
abused his discretion in refusing to co 
ue the trial to allow her new attorney 
prepare for trial. 
[16] The granting of a continua 
rests in the sound discretion of the i 
court. Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osbo\ 
622 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1981). The jud| 
action in denying a continuance will noi 
reversed on appeal unless the court 
Lema further testified that in September 1 
appellant requested that he mail cocaine to 
boyfriend in Phoenix, and that appellant ad 
ted that she had been using cocaine that n 
and that her boyfriend was a cocaine dealer. 
Lema's opinion, appellant was addicted to 
caine in spite of the treatment program, 
was "strung out and wanted to get more . 
more all the time." 
926 Utah 776 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
abused that discretion by acting unreason-
ably. Chrtstenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988); see also Patton v. 
Evans, 92 Utah 524, 69 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah 
1937). 
[17] In the present case, the judge had 
already continued the trial at appellant's 
request on one other occasion so that her 
new counsel could prepare the case. Fur-
ther, prosecution of the case had been sub-
stantially delayed by appellant's dilatory 
conduct in failing to agree on expert wit-
nesses and in failing to retain new counsel 
in a timely manner. The trial judge had 
made it clear to the parties on several 
occasions that he considered time to be of 
the essence, and that S.'s best interests 
required the resolution of the custody dis-
pute in as short a time as possible. Under 
these circumstances, we do not find that 
the trial judge acted unreasonably in re-
fusing to grant appellant another continu-
ance to prepare for trial. We find this and 
appellant's remaining issues to be without 
merit. 
AWARD OF COSTS 
[18,19] Respondent asserts that, as the 
prevailing party, he should have been 
awarded costs totaling $803.70 for filing 
fees, witness fees, service fees, and report-
er fees pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 54(d), 
which provides, in part, that "[ejxcept 
when express provision therefor is made 
either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to 
the prevailing party unless the court other-
wise directs." This statute leaves the 
question of costs "somewhat in the discre-
tion of the courts." Hull v. Goodman, 4 
Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245, 247 (1955). Fur-
ther, in modification of divorce decrees pur-
suant to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
trial court set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5 (1984), the question of the ability 
or inability of a party to pay costs in de-
fending the matter is a factual matter 
which lies in the discretion of the trial 
court. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 
36, 368 P.2d 264, 266 (1962). There was 
substantial evidence set forth in the record 
as to appellant's precarious financial cir-
cumstances as compared to respondent's 
relatively prosperous situation to justify 
the trial court's refusal to award costs to 
respondent. 
We affirm the trial court on these re-
maining issues and find that its failure to 
bifurcate the hearing was not reversible 
error. We remand, however, for adequate 
findings regarding the stability and conti-
nuity of appellant's custodial relationship 
with S. and S.'s best interests. 
DAVIDSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
!«YNMIKISVsifM} 
Stanley C. MANN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
H. Wayne WADSWORTH, Watkiss, & 
Campbell, and Does 1-10, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 870211-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 20, 1989. 
Former defendant in conspiracy action 
brought action against attorney and attor-
ney's law firm, alleging malicious prosecu-
tion. The District Court, Third District, 
Salt Lake County, John A. Rokich, J., en-
tered summary judgment of dismissal in 
favor of firm and, on jury verdict, entered 
judgment in favor of attorney. Plaintiff 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, J. Robert 
Bullock, Senior Judge, held that: (1) suffi-
cient factual basis for a disqualifying trial 
judge was lacking; (2) trial court errone-
ously applied doctrine of respondeat superi-
or in dismissing firm; but (3) dismissal was 
harmless error. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judges <*»51(3) 
Sufficient factual basis for disqualify-
ing judge was lacking absent specification 
of nature and time of judge's averred prior 
relationship with defendant law firm; mo-
tion seeking disqualification alleged only 
that judge was once "of counsel" to firm. 
2. Malicious Prosecution *»42 
Vicarious liability of law firm for acts 
of its attorney, under doctrine of responde-
at superior, did not depend on finding of 
express authorization for attorney's acts 
and, accordingly, trial court should not 
have dismissed firm in malicious prosecu-
tion action on grounds that attorney had 
not been authorized to commit act of mali-
cious prosecution and that, therefore, acts 
complained of were outside scope of attor-
ney's employment. 
3. Appeal and Error «=»1062.2 
Trial court's erroneous failure to allow 
jury to determine whether attorney alleged 
to have engaged in malicious prosecution 
was acting within scope of his employment, 
so as to impose liability on attorney's em-
ployer under doctrine of respondeat superi-
or, was harmless in light of jury's finding 
that attorney was not liable; employer's 
liability under respondeat superior was vi-
carious and did not exist apart from attor-
ney's liability. 
4. Appeal and Error «=»499(4) 
Appellate court would not consider cor-
rectness of instruction for first time on 
appeal absent specific objection on record 
or compelling reason to do so. 
5. Appeal and Error <8=»199, 499(1) 
Appellate court was not in position to 
consider alleged deficiencies in discovery 
where such deficiencies were not called to 
attention of trial court or made part of 
record. 
MANN v. WADSWORTH I 
Cite M 776 PJd 926 (UtahApp. 1989) 
Ray R. Christensen, Gainer Bd 
lig, Salt Lake City, for defendan 
spondents. 
Stanley C. Mann, Salt Lake City, pro se. 
I. J. Robert Bullock, Senior Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-S-24(l)(j) (1987). 
Before BULLOCK,1 GREENE 
and NEWEY,2 JJ. 
J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Judg< 
Plaintiff Stanley C. Mann appei 
judgment on a verdict dismissing 
for malicious prosecution again 
dant H. Wayne Wadsworth, an* 
summary judgment of dismissal i 
defendant Watkiss & Campbell, 
firm. 
The events leading to Mann's 
gan with a dispute over cusUx 
adopted minor child, David 
David's adoptive parents were 
and he was placed in the custxx 
adoptive mother, Mann's niece, 
leaving a will designating Mann 
wife guardians of David. There* 
Manns petitioned for their appoin 
David's guardians. However, 
adoptive father, Mark Wheeler, r 
ed by defendant Wadsworth of 
firm of Watkiss & Campbell, confc 
Manns' petition, and counterpetiti 
award of the child's custody to hir 
an initial temporary award of cue 
mediately following the death of tl 
adoptive mother, permanent cust 
awarded to the child's adoptive 
Mark Wheeler, and his wife Sylv 
Shortly after the initial hearing 
custody question but before the pe 
custody award, Mark Wheeler v 
three times in May of 1979 at his 
California. Though critically injt 
survived, but was unable to idet 
assailant. His present wife, Sylvi} 
was an eyewitness to the shooting, 
also unable to consciously identify 
sailant. However, in a hypnotic ii 
conducted by police, she identified i 
being at the scene of the shoot 
leaving in the getaway car with t 
man. 
2. Robert L. Newey, Senior Judge, sittir. 
cial appointment pursuant to Utah C 
§ 78-3-24(l)(j) (1987). 
